Man, having total win value numbers on the site is fun. The things you can find are endless. For instance, did you know that in 2002, Neifi Perez was worth 3.5 wins less than a replacement level player. Three and a half wins! Seriously, check it out.

The Royals made him their everyday shortstop and gave him 585 plate appearances. He rewarded them with a .236/.260/.303 line, which translates to a .243 wOBA, or 40 runs below an average hitter in that season. That’s really bad.

Of course, the Royals were paying Perez for his glove, not his bat. Unfortunately, he wasn’t too hot with that, either, posting a -12 UZR at shortstop and a -1.2 UZR at second base that season. He would have had to been Ozzie Smith with the glove to offset his horrendous offensive performance, but instead, he was more like Ozzie Canseco defensively, and that’s not a good combination.

Neifi Perez‘s performance in 2002 cost the Royals three and a half wins beyond just what fielding a league minimum, Triple-A shortstop instead. The going per-win rate in 2002 was $2.6 million, so Neifi Perez‘s value was a staggering negative nine million. Oh, and the Royals paid him $4.1 million that year. Total loss – $13 million.

The Royals had a $47 million payroll in 2002. By employing Neifi Perez, they lowered their effective payroll to $34 million, because by having Perez on the roster, they needed to allocate $13 million just to get back to zero.

That’s a bad season right there.

It has been a relatively quiet winter for the Chicago Cubs organization. Aside from bringing in a couple of complementary players, including reliever Kevin Gregg and outfielder Joey Gathright, the organization has been operating in a reserved manner – although retaining free agent starter Ryan Dempster was no small feat. The club made some much smaller waves when it added three pitching prospects – Mitch Atkins, Justin Berg and Marcos Mateo – to the 40-man roster early on in the off-season.

Drafted out of high school, Atkins has moved up the organization’s ladder relatively quietly. The right-hander has put up some good won-loss numbers, having gone 39-19 since 2006 – as well as 17-7 in 28 starts split between Double-A and Triple-A in 2008. However, his other numbers are not quite as impressive, including his FIP, which was 5.70 in 10 Triple-A starts in 2008. His K-BB ratio was also a modest 1.91, along with a walk rate of 3.81 BB/9 and a strikeout rate of 7.29 K/9. Atkins’ repertoire includes a low-90s fastball, a curveball and a change-up – and he projects as more of a bottom-of-the-rotation starter despite his big win totals.

Berg is your typical frustrating right-hander. He throws a hard, sinking fastball that tops out around 94 mph, but he fails to strikeout as many batters as he should and the walks continue to be an issue. In 90.1 Triple-A innings in 2008, Berg posted rates of 4.78 BB/9 and just 4.88 K/9. That strikeout rate was his highest one since 2006 when he managed to strike out 6.42 batters per nine innings in High-A ball. Along with sharpening his command, Berg needs to improve his secondary pitches so batters do not sit on his fastball. The 24-year-old hurler has played around with both a slider and a curveball, favoring the former for much of 2008 with mixed results.

Mateo has the farthest climb to make up the organization’s ladder, as he spent much of 2008 in High-A ball. The right-handed reliever was originally acquired from the Cincinnati Reds organization in 2007 for minor league outfielder Buck Coats (now in the Blue Jays organization). In 2008, Mateo split his time between the starting rotation and the bullpen and allowed 87 hits in 88.1 innings of work. He also posted rates of 2.95 BB/9 and 6.62 K/9. Mateo spent the season working on developing a change-up to go with his 90-94 mph fastball and slider. Despite making some strides in 2008, he still projects as a MLB set-up man.

With Kevin Cash signing a minor league deal with the New York Yankees (certain to embark more gamesmanship talk than the move merits) and Jason Varitek hanging in limbo, the Red Sox will need to find two catchers in a rather weak catching market. Unlike most teams, Boston’s reserve catcher does not simply play on random or in day games following night games. Instead, the back-up catcher for the past few seasons is simply Tim Wakefield’s caddy. That means the Red Sox are looking for a quality starter and a back up with either experience dealing with knucklers or a willingness and aptitude to do so.

It seems likely that George Kottaras, perhaps best known for being the return on David Wells, will be the Sox reserve backstop in 2009. An offensively gifted catcher, Kottaras produced 7.6 wRAA for Pawtucket last season, and throughout his career is usually around league average. Next year’s strikeout rates could look ugly, but Kottaras does a decent job of drawing walks, which helps to offset some of the sting. As for actually catching, Kottaras looks awful. In 70 games with Pawtucket Kottaras threw out ~19% of baserunners, or 15 of 80 and had 10 passed balls. It’s worth noting that Kottaras did catch a knuckleballer in Pawtucket by the name of Charlie Zink. While it would be easy to blame that connection on Kottaras poor numbers, Kottaras body of work speaks against the notion that Zink was the catalyst for defensive ineptitude.

If Kottaras is the back-up, who is the starter? The Elias Sports Bureau all but guaranteed Jason Varitek’s career would end in a Red Sox uniform when their compensatory system crowned him as a Type-A free agent. Varitek’s not getting any younger, and if you recall, was pitiful last season. Flashing a low line drive rate while walking less and whiffing more. Fans and pundits alike will talk up Varitek’s game calling abilities along with intangibles immeasurable. Denying that such attributes exist is foolhardy; instead we’ll assume the effects are marginal until proven otherwise.

Of course, there’s also the loyalty aspect between the two sides. When Boston traded Heathcliff Slocumb to the Seattle Mariners for Derek Lowe and the 25-year-old Varitek in 1997, they had no idea a minor league catcher without a great track record of success would turn into a stalwart through a decade and two World Series championship teams. To all of those who would say the Sox owe it to Varitek, I would remind you that the Sox should be committed first and foremost to winning. Sometimes to keep that commitment, emotions must be placed aside. Varitek’s performances have yet to reach the point where it hurts the Red Sox by simply playing (1.3 WAR in 2008, three-year average of ~1.8) but he’s nearing the age where a total collapse is not unexpected.

Finding a worthwhile catcher on the free agent market is tough as usual. A name that leaps off the list in terms of low-risk medium-reward is Josh Bard. The former Sox, Bard is an interesting buy-low candidate, in large part due to bad luck. A .230 batting average on balls in play and 21.6% line drives, don’t gel whatsoever. Bard’s walk and strikeout rates remained static to his career averages, and unlike last time, catching a knuckleball will not be in the job description. Over the last three seasons, Bard’s average WAR is higher than Varitek’s, albeit in fewer plate appearances.

The other option for Boston is to acquire a catcher via trade. Texas Jarrod Saltalamacchia is the best longevity-pleasing option around. Whether the Red Sox are willing to part with the price associated with the former top prospect, (likely one of the Buccholz/Bowden/Masterson trio) is to be seen. Saltalamacchia struck out 37.4% last season, yet still found a way to walk enough to maintain a decent on-base percentage. The power shown in the minors should come soon, even if the defense remains shoddy. Saltalamacchia is only expendable because of the Rangers young studded catching surplus, the equivalent of running a gun shop during the zombie apocalypse.

Given Boston’s proficiency in managing their roster correctly, you almost have to expect the Sox to upgrade behind the dish heading into next season.

For those unaware, Fangraphs unveiled a new section on the player pages today. The section takes all of the dollar valuation components we have manually calculated, harnesses the stats, and outputs wins above replacement level as well as the player’s fair market value salary based on his production.

The Philadelphia Phillies won the World Series in 2008, their first since 1980. Much of the attention garnered by the team went in the direction of superstars Chase Utley and Cole Hamels, former MVP winners Ryan Howard and Jimmy Rollins, and the 41-41 closer Brad Lidge. While all five of these players deserved some form of recognition for the success of the team, a few other players contributed a good amount. These players made their contributions under the radar, though, and prior to the post-season were not even household names. Guys like Jayson Werth and Shane Victorino fit this bill.

Werth was a former first-round draft pick of the Orioles in 1997, but did not truly find a home until 2007. After health problems while playing for the Blue Jays and Dodgers limited his availability and production, the LA bunch cut ties with Werth following the 2006 campaign, one that he completely missed due to injuries. Pat Gillick, who drafted Werth while helming the Orioles, quickly brought him to the Phillies.

Still under control, Werth signed a 1-yr deal worth $850,000. With the going rate of $4.1 mil/win in 2007, Gillick’s deal valued Werth as a +2 run, +0.2 win player. In 304 plate appearances that year, Werth put together an impressive .298/.404/.459 line, good for a .385 wOBA. His production benefited from a regression-bound .391 BABIP, but Werth’s offense resulted in +11.7 runs above average.

Defensively, he proved stellar as well, with a UZR rating of +11.5 runs. Though he failed to qualify for the overall leaderboards, this defensive rating ranked fifth in the senior circuit amongst anyone with 550+ innings played in the entire outfield. All told, after adjustments are taken into account, Werth’s worth was +2.8 wins. If he had signed a contract that valued his production appropriately, the terms would be 1-yr/$11.6 mil.

In 2008, the BABIP plummeted to .327, resulting in a still productive but different slash line of .273/.363/.498. Werth lost some ability to reach base, but made up for it with an increase in power. Because of the increased output elsewhere, his wOBA remained virtually the same, at .382. The biggest difference, however, came in the form of playing time. Werth partook in 134 games last season, amassing 482 PA in the process.

His offensive production almost doubled to +21.6 runs above average. Werth also produced another fantastic season with the glove, putting together a UZR rating of +15.8 runs in the outfield. Among outfielders with at least 950 innings played, this ranks fifth in the entire sport, and second in the senior circuit to just Randy Winn.

In 2008, Jayson Werth became a +4.9 win player. 4.9 wins! Mark Teixeira‘s projection for next season calls for something like +5.1 wins. Werth had re-signed for a 1-yr/$1.7 mil contract that doubled his previous season’s salary, but ended up being worth much more money than that. If he signed for his fair market value, the deal would have been closer to $22 mil.

Moving forward, his 2009 projections call for a .375 wOBA, +20 offensive runs, +12 defensive runs, and after adjustments, +43 value runs. This converts to approximately +4.15 wins, and $20.8 mil.

Werth is one of many arbitration-eligible members of the Phillies, and will likely see his salary bumped to around $4 mil for the 2009 season. Assuming this comes to fruition, he will have earned $6.55 mil from the Phillies from 2007-09, while producing +11.85 wins above replacement level. If his deserved salaries are added, we get a figure of $54.4 mil.

It is easy to lampoon GMs for dishing out ridiculous deals to players like Adam Eaton, but they deserve equal praise for acquiring players as productive as Werth. Players who, despite being under control, are able to be had for about nine times less than their fair market value.

Win Values are here! See the post below. Woo!

If I asked you to name one guy who doesn’t currently have a starting job in major league baseball (or will get one after he signs his new contract) but deserved one, who would you say?

I’d say there’s one guy who stands out from the pack, and that guy is Willy Aybar.

From 2005 to 2008, in his age 22 to 25 seasons, Aybar has accumulated 745 plate appearances, or a little more than one full season’s worth of playing time. His career wOBA is .339, thanks to a good contact/gap power skillset, making him an above average major league hitter. 2008 was his worst year from a raw statistics perspective, with his .321 wOBA and -0.18 WPA/LI. However, he was remarkably unlucky in terms of batting average on balls in play – a .267 BABIP that simply wasn’t supported by how he hit the ball. Chris Dutton’s BABIP predictor had Aybar’s 2008 expected batting average on balls in play to come in at .314. Had the distribution of his balls in play been normal, Aybar would have hit something like .289/.363/.460. He improved offensively in 2008, even if the results don’t show it.

Defensively, he’s played mostly third, but also some second and first, and UZR has him above average at all three positions. As a +2 third baseman over 1,000 innings, it’d be fair to suggest that he could be solid defensively there, and he potentially could handle second base. He’s done well at the keystone in limited time, and as we explored earlier, most third baseman who also play second don’t see a drop in performance when shifting from one spot to the other.

In terms of total value (now available on the player pages), Aybar has been worth +3.8 wins over a replacement level player in his major league career. That works out to +3 wins per 600 PA. And remember, that doesn’t account for his rotten BABIP luck last year.

Right now, Aybar’s probably a true talent +2.5 to +3.0 win player with upside – a 26-year-old switch hitting infielder who can play multiple positions and has untapped offensive abilities, but doesn’t have to improve at all to already be above average.

The Rays don’t have any room for him in their line-up, and it wouldn’t be surprising if they kept him around as injury insurance. However, Willy Aybar deserves a full time job, and hopefully he gets one.

There’s a new section in the batting player pages which does the job of calculating a player’s runs over replacement and wins over replacement. Major thanks goes to Dave Cameron, Sean Smith, and Tangotiger for instructing me on the best way to do this.

Under each “Value” section you’ll find:

Batting – wRAA (Runs Above Average) with a park adjustment.
Fielding – The sum of a player’s UZR.
Replacement – The replacement level adjustment set at 20 Runs / 600 PA.
Positional – The positional adjustment set using Tangotiger’s values (see this link)
Value Runs – The sum of Batting, Fielding, Replacement, and Positional.
Value Wins – Value Runs converted to a wins scale.
Dollars – Value Wins converted to the following dollar scale:

2002 – $2.6m / win
2003 – $2.8m / win
2004 – $3.1m / win
2005 – $3.4m / win
2006 – $3.7m / win
2007 – $4.1m / win
2008 – $4.5m / win

This will all eventually be in the leaderboards and team pages, probably later this week.

With the Mark Teixeira saga now appeared to be over and the Yankees the victors, there are a handful of teams that thought they were or might have been in the running for Teixeira’s services at first base that now have to move on to other plans.

Boston seems like the easiest. They never had a hole at first base, they seemed to be pursuing Teixeira more out of pure interest and payroll room than any pressing need. All signs point to them simply staying at the status quo with Youkilis at first base. If Mike Lowell‘s recovery doesn’t go smoothly, they could end up moving Youkilis back to third to cover there and that would open up a hole at first base, but reports so far have been positive for Lowell.

Anaheim has an in house candidate, Kendry Morales, for first base (how does that Kotchman trade look now?), but with a line-up hurting for offense there is still the chance that they pursue one of Pat Burrell or Adam Dunn and stick him at first base. Dunn would make the more sense of the two as Anaheim’s lineup is already stacked with right-handed hitters, but adding either of them to first base (or even the outfield) would further worsen their defense and almost certainly wouldn’t be worth the overall cost.

Baltimore could turn back to Kevin Millar for another one-year go-around or they could aim to try acquiring and giving auditions to some languishing AAAA players like Tampa did with Carlos Pena a few years back. With the Rays, Red Sox and a newly reloaded Yankees in their division, it’s not like the Orioles have to be fully focused on trying to fight for a playoff spot this season.

In the nation’s capital, the Washington Nationals are already under the financial burden of Dmitri Young, currently on their Triple-A roster, at $5 million and Nick Johnson for $5.5 million. At least losing out on Teixeira means they will have the opportunity to give Johnson a fifteenth chance to stay healthy. And never fear, because they just signed Corey Patterson!

It’s time to play everyone’s favorite statistical game, Hidden Identities! Below are the projected stat-lines in 2009 for two different pitchers, averaged together from a few different projection systems. As you may have gathered from previous examples of this game, the two pitchers are not as close in reputation as they are in projected performance.

Pitcher A: 170 IP, 4.58 FIP, +1.7 WAR
Pitcher B: 150 IP, 4.65 FIP, +1.4 WAR

Both of these pitchers seem pretty darn close in terms of their true talent levels. Pitcher A may be a bit more durable and effective, and overall a better pitcher, but the performance discrepancies are not nearly vast enough to deem A a #3-type starter and B lucky to be considered a #5 on a decent team. Before divulging their true identities, the point here is to show that there are usually alternatives to be had when filling out the back of your rotation, players whose performances won’t light the world on fire but will have some value over the replacement level while costing next to nothing.

Player A is Oliver Perez, the Boras client currently being compared to Sandy Koufax. Player B is Odalis Perez, member of the 2008 Washington Nationals who was all but forgotten a few years back. Oliver is seeking a very lucrative deal, likely similar in value and years to the contract recently signed by Ryan Dempster. Odalis is seeking… well… a job next season. In fair market value terms, this is a difference of $8.5 mil for Oliver and $7 mil for Odalis, not that substantial.

Odalis isn’t the only such player, either. Granted, it is very difficult to find someone worth over one win that can be had on the cheap, but a few other pitchers are currently available for small stipends that have value above replacement level. The three pitchers I have in mind are Josh Fogg, Kip Wells, and Jon Lieber. At this stage in their careers, none are bound to make the all star team or anything of that variety, but package projections calling for positive win production at under $4 mil.

Fogg and Wells are coming off of very poor ERA-seasons, which deflates their overall value even though their controllable skills are a half-win or more above replacement. Lieber is old and coming off of a season in which he made under 30 relief appearances.

Fogg’s projections call for around 120 innings at a 5.07 FIP. This puts him at +5 runs, and worth $2.5 mil on the open market. Coming off of a poor 2008 season in which he made just $1 mil, he could likely be had for a similar fee under his fair market value.

Wells split time between the Rockies and Royals, primarily pitching out of the bullpen. His projection calls for a 4.75 FIP in 80 innings of work, which would bump up to around 5.00, as a starter. This would make Wells a +5 run, +0.5 win pitcher. Last season, he made $3.1 mil, and based on his poor ERA as well as the decreased salaries being given to relievers this offseason, probably will not earn more than his $2.5 mil fair market value.

Lieber is older than Fogg and Wells, but has a projection calling for similar production. If a team has a solid prospect waiting in the wings, the production of these three could be replicated for the league minimum of $400k. However, the aforementioned three are available for what should be small fees.

At prices higher than their fair market values, stay away, but if you can sign Kip Wells or Lieber or Fogg to a 1-yr/$1-2 mil deal, it is something to seriously consider. These pitchers will not bump a team up from 86 wins to 89 or anything along those lines, but a deal like this would carry with it so little commitment or monetary risk.

“I apologize on behalf of Yankee fans everywhere.” — my friend Ryan.

If you haven’t heard, the Evil Empire apparently wasn’t done angering everyone this winter, so they topped off their off-season with a side course of Mark Teixeira. The rumored contract terms are 8 years and $170 million. I had him pegged for 7 years and $171 million back before the off-season started and we realized that this was going to be a pretty big buyer’s market. If this were a normal off-season, we’d call this pretty standard for a free agent contract, but it’s not a normal off-season, and now the Yankees have given out the three largest contracts this winter, and it’s not particularly close.

CC Sabathia: $23 million per year
Teixeira: $22.5 million per year
A.J. Burnett: $16.4 million per year

Ryan Dempster: $13 million per year

With the additions of Teixeira and Sabathia to go along with Alex Rodriguez and Derek Jeter, the Yankees now have the four highest paid players in baseball. Including their luxury tax payments, the Yankees are going to blow by $250 million in spending on their 25 man roster for 2009. They’re spending in excess of $10 million on each and every single spot on the team.

If you’re a Yankee fan, congratulations, this is what it feels like to root for the casinos in Las Vegas. The rest of baseball are casual gamblers, and you’re the guys rigging the games in your favor. I hope it’s fun for you.

As for what this move means, Teixeira replaces Melky Cabrera in the line-up and pushes Nick Swisher into the outfield. That upgrade should represent something like 3-4 wins for the Yankees (it would be closer to five if Teixeira was replacing a true replacement level player), so they’re paying about $6 million per win for their franchise. Considering that adding Teixeira probably puts them from something like an 88 win team to a 92 win team, that’s a bargain for those four wins, because this signing pushes the Yankees from “contenders” to “best team in baseball” status. That’s a pretty big leap in terms of expected playoff odds, and the Yankees certainly understand how adding Teixeira should help them improve their chances of playing in October.

Teixeira gets to play on the east coast, gets a ton of money, and will have a chance to play on a winner for the rest of his career. The Yankees get an all-star caliber player who hasn’t yet hit 30. And the rest of baseball gets a reminder that the Yankees are playing with a ridiculous competitive advantage, and that they’re really just competing against the other 28 teams for 7 playoff spots.

Screw the Yankees. Go Rays and Red Sox.

This offseason has been particularly interesting, as seven, count them, seven, corner outfielders with similar skillsets hit the open market. Bobby Abreu, Garrett Anderson, Pat Burrell, Adam Dunn, Ken Griffey, Raul Ibanez and Manny Ramirez all became free agents, all looking to hit a big payday. To date, only Ibanez has signed, and that deal has been largely lampooned.

With a surplus at the position, the market price has seemingly been driven down. After all, why pay an exorbitant fee for Burrell if Abreu could be had for slightly less? Or, replace either of those two names with any of the aforementioned others and the rhetorical question still works. Anderson is a better fielder than hitter, but the remaining players can all be classified as good-hitting, bad-fielding players.

If we want to include Anderson in the mix, this classification can be adjusted to show that these seven players are all one-dimensional.

Going along with the idea of positional adjustments that Dave has written so much about this week, I thought it would be interesting to show the production levels and dollar valuations for everyone sans-Ibanez at both the corner outfield position and designated hitter spot.

Before examining the results, let it be known that the positional adjustments are -7.5 runs per 162 games for LF, and -17.5 runs per 162 games for DH. Short of 162 games, these are prorated. The value above replacement is +20 runs per 600 PA, prorated below that number. Here are the results if they signed on as a leftfielder:

Name        PA/GP    wRAA   UZR    Pos.   Adj.  WAR
Abreu      600/159   16.0  -14.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.46
Anderson   540/140   -6.0    5.0   18.0  -6.5   +1.05
Burrell    600/157   19.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +1.97
Dunn       600/159   23.0  -12.0   20.0  -7.4   +2.36
Griffey    550/130    2.0  -13.0   18.0  -6.0   +0.10
Ramirez    580/150   35.0  -12.0   19.0  -6.9   +3.51

As a corner outfielder, Ramirez is still the cream of the crop, with Dunn coming in over one win less valuable. Griffey is essentially the definition of a replacement player, and the rest project as below average players. In Burrell’s case, he projects as an average player next year, but at his age, a sharper decline isn’t out of the question. How about if they were to serve as designated hitters instead of outfielders?

To convert to designated hitters, we prorate the -17.5 positional adjustment per 162 games and get rid of the UZR projections. This bumps up the value of Burrell, Abreu, Dunn, Manny, and Griffey. Anderson, who projects to be below average offensively, loses value.

Burrell shifts from +1.97 to +2.20. Abreu from +1.46 to +1.88. Dunn from +2.36 to +2.58. Manny from +3.51 to +3.70. And Griffey from +0.10 to +0.60. Anderson digresses from +1.05 to -0.30, becoming a below replacement level player if he signs as a designated hitter. Translated to dollars, here are the discrepancies between being a LF and DH:

Name       LF WAR   LF FMV    DH WAR    DH FMV
Abreu      +1.46    $7.30     +1.88     $9.40
Anderson   +1.05    $5.20     -0.30     $0.40
Burrell    +1.97    $9.85     +2.20    $11.00
Dunn       +2.36   $11.80     +2.58    $12.90
Griffey    +0.10    $0.50     +0.60     $3.00
Ramirez    +3.51   $17.55     +3.70    $18.50

These results suggest that everyone but Anderson would better serve their team as a designated hitter than leftfielder. For teams, perhaps the most financially interesting dilemma is how much to offer these players given how many of them are on the market. If teams can sign these players for their leftfield fair market value and play them at DH, they will get a steal of sorts. But, if the Ibanez signing is a sign of things to come, teams still do not understand the value of defense.

Still, the calendar year is almost over and these six players are yet to find new homes. A couple may get the paydays initially sought, but others may have to substantially lower their requests to garner a full year’s worth of playing time.

The Pittsburgh Pirates organization takes a lot of beatings from media, as well as from the online community of baseball bloggers. Many of the criticisms are justified, while others are not.

The Pirates organization added six players to the 40-man roster recently. Two of those moves – Neil Walker and Jose Tabata – were no-brainers. The other four, though, were questionable: pitchers Evan Meek, Jeff Sues, Ronald Uviedo, and catcher Steve Lerud. While Walker and Tabata are among the best prospects in the relatively weak system, the remaining four currently project as below-average Major League regulars.

Meek is a former Rule 5 pick who has bounced around the waiver wire more than once. He did make huge strides with his control in the minors in 2008, but his walk rate jumped back up to 8.31 BB/9 in (small sample size warning) 13 MLB innings in 2008. In 41.1 Triple-A innings in 2008, Meek allowed just 30 hits. He features a low-90s fastball, as well as a splitter and slider.

Sues was a fifth-round selection in the 2005 draft out of Vanderbilt University, where he split time between the bullpen and the starting rotation. He settled into the bullpen in 2008 after appearing in just eight pro games between 2005 and 2007. Sues has struggled with medical issues since his college days and his durability is a huge question mark. His fastball is in the low 90s (and can touch the mid-90s) and he has a plus slider. In 2008, he pitched a career-high 64.1 innings between High-A and Double-A. In 43 Double-A innings, he allowed 35 hits and posted rates of 4.19 BB/9 and 11.51 K/9. He is a flyball pitcher who induced ground balls at a rate of 36 percent. Sues, like Meeks, is another run-of-the-mill right-handed middle reliever who is a dime-a-dozen at the Double-A and Triple-A level.

Hey look, another right-handed middle reliever. Uviedo, a Venezuelan, at least has age on his side at 22. In just his second season stateside, the 6’0” reliever allowed 70 hits in 71.2 A-ball innings. He also posted rates of 1.88 BB/9 and 9.54 K/9. Uviedo earned a late-season promotion to High-A ball and allowed just five hits in 16 innings, but his rates dropped to 2.81 BB/9 and 6.75 K/9. He also had an atrocious groundball rate of 37 percent in A-ball. The fastball has some giddy-up, but his other pitches are still developing.

Lerud, 24, was definitely an interesting player to add to the 40-man roster – but not in a good way. He has a career line of .225/.308/.369 in 1,436 at-bats over five seasons. Lerud split 2008 between High-A and Double-A and managed to hit just .233/.300/.363 at the latter level in 146 at-bats so he is not going to begin 2009 in the Majors. Regardless of how good his defence might be, there are three catchers on the 40-man roster with more potential than Lerud: Ryan Doumit, Robinzon Diaz and Jason Jaramillo.

The Pirates organization added three fringe right-handed pitchers in 2007 – Ronald Belisario, Luis Munoz and Olivo Astacio – and none of them lasted the entire season on the 40-man roster. In fact, Astacio is the only member of the trio still in the organization. None of them spent even a game at the Major League level in 2008.

The thing to remember about adding fringe prospects to the 40-man roster is that if you remove them, they can be claimed by any one of the remaining 29 teams and can be optioned down to the minors (as long as option years remain). But if you leave them off the 40-man roster until you are sure that they are deserving, clubs have to spend a Rule 5 pick to acquire them and then keep them on their 40-man rosters for the entire season. The latter transaction is much harder to pull off, especially considering the player is already a fringe prospect to begin with so they are not likely to be Major-League ready.

Yesterday, we talked about center fielders and their relationship to infielders. Like with the 2B/3B conversation last week, the conclusion was mostly unsatisfying. We know how good outfielders are in relation to each other, just like we know how good infielders are in relation to each other, but trying to figure out the difference between infielders and outfielders is a much tougher task.

Some players, like Willie Harris, have skillsets that work a lot better in the outfield than in the infield, where speed is a much bigger factor. Other players, such as Scott Rolen, have the skills to be elite defensive infielders, but don’t profile as guys who would do nearly as well in the outfield. There simply isn’t a blanket statement we can make about the relative difficulties of playing infield and playing outfield that apply to everyone.

Right now, the best we can do is make generalizations that are true across large groups. In that way, perhaps the best way to think of position adjustments are similar to how we think of park factors. Safeco Field depresses offense, so when we look at park adjusted numbers, we give a bump to all hitters and downgrade all pitchers. However, Safeco doesn’t treat all hitters evenly, being brutal on RH bats and pretty friendly to LH bats. Despite this, we still have to conclude that the runs created by LH bats are more valuable, because of the depressed run environment, than they would be if the park was more hitter friendly to RH batters.

Likewise, we know that the pool of players that can play the infield is smaller than the pool that can play the outfield. Since the pool of potential outfielders is larger than the potential pool of infielders (especially 2B/3B/SS), we have to recognize the extra value that infielders provide by doing something that outfielders cannot do.

The position adjustments we have aren’t perfect – we know that. There are some players who could move between positions easier than the adjustments would suggest, and others who would be significantly worse than the adjustment level if moved to a tougher position. But, ignoring position adjustments because they aren’t perfect would be akin to ignoring park factors because they don’t treat all players the same, and I think we all agree that ignoring park factors would be a step back in the understanding of player valuation.

There’s a lot more research that can be done on the relationship between the 2B/3B/SS and CF/LF/RF groups of players. Now that FanGraphs has UZR data available, we’ll continue to explore these issues, and hopefully bring more light to the relative value of each defensive position.

Atlanta: Greg Norton (1/800k)

Gregory Blakemoor Norton possesses the best middle name in baseball, challenged only by Curt Montague Schilling. Norton started 2008 with Seattle, hitting .438/.500/.563 with 16 at-bats. Because Jose Vidro is awesome, the Mariners chose to deal him to Atlanta for a player to be named later. With the Braves, he would see an additional 171 at-bats, hitting .246/.361/.427 and convincing them into another contract. Offensively, his skillset lacks consistent homerun power, but does have excellent plate discipline. Since Norton is average at first base and poor elsewhere, this leaves the Braves with Norton as a pinch-hitter. Norton will be lucky to get 200 plate appearances, and even if he does, apathy is likely to reign supreme. Norton figures to teeter close to replacement level.

Detroit: Matt Treanor (1/750k)

Nichols Law of Catcher Defense states an inverse relationship between offensive performance and defensive reputation. Even as a catcher, Treanor’s not much of a hitter, which probably explains why he’s the “perfect back-up”. Observe this article, in which Todd Jones outlines Treanor’s strengths as: handles pitchers well, has cool wife, can really throw, dependable behind the dish. We don’t really know whether Treanor possesses inherent abilities in game calling that separate him from others, but even if you give him marginal credit for that, how much is that really worth? Even with five runs of defensive credit and a positional bonus Treanor’s not too valuable. His wife is an Olympic medalist, that’s neat. Treanor has thrown out about 25% of career attempted base thieves, so I guess he can throw. As for dependability, I suppose he doesn’t leave the plate until the final out of the half inning is recorded. That’s important.

Houston: Aaron Boone (1/750k)

Can you believe Aaron Boone will soon be 36? No? Well even less believable is that Boone and Geoff Blum appear to be your 2009 Houston Astros third base platoon. Yes, the Astros are going to a basic platoon based on the opposing pitchers hand. There’s not much to mess up here. You would expect Blum and Boone to show dominant statistics versus one of the hands, and with Boone being a right-handed hitter, he’s the one who beats up southpaws, right?

Boone:

Blum:

Oh, those splits just scream platoon partners.

The Astros are leaving third base up to a pair of 36-year-olds with bizarre splits that present a marginal upgrade over going with just one. Blum is a decent defender, and assuming he gets the lion share of plate appearances might keep this from falling to replacement level.

A week ago over on USS Mariner, Dave Cameron brought up the Seattle Mariners current glut of starting pitchers and, explored a little further in the comments, brought up the topic of what to do with Erik Bedard‘s future might or might not be. It is a fascinating case study for what was perhaps the best pitcher in the American League in 2007.

For the purposes of brevity, I am going to assume that you are aware of Bedard’s general playing history to avoid doing any kind of detailed recap of the past. Where it stands now is that Bedard is coming off just 81 innings last season after now-departed GM Bill Bavasi traded an ark of talent to Baltimore for his services. With free agency looming after 2009 and a laundry list of past injuries dogging him, Bedard gives the Mariners little in the way of trade value. As a comparison, look at how well Rich Harden had to pitch in order to net the Cubs anything of value at the deadline, and Harden came with a year and a half of team control.

So it seems that the only hope along the trade front for the Mariners is that Bedard recreates 2007 this season and Seattle is able to flip him in July to a team hovering on the edge of a playoff run. Even then though, it seems like the best comparison would be the Angels’ trade for Teixeira this past summer but with a well-discounted return for Bedard being a pitcher and a fragile one at that. That’s hardly a return to write home about.

Another side effect of Bedard’s injured 2008 campaign is that in order to regain Type A free agent status at the end of 2009, he would have to mirror 2007. Bedard barely finished as a Type A after this past season and with 2007 coming off the books, he would have to replace it with a season of roughly equal value according to Elias.

So if Bedard does manage to replicate 2007, the Mariners might have some options; either to try and trade him or hold onto him and hope he garners Type A status at the end of the year and gain them some draft pick compensation that would take some of the sting out of taking in the shorts when they traded for him. But we have to be realistic and note the chance of that happening is minuscule.

More likely, Bedard performs at a level that will only net him Type B compensation and no team will offer much for his services at the deadline. So, what to do? Well, there is a third option and that’s approaching Bedard with the hope of signing him to an extension. Throwing out the unknowables, such as whether Bedard would even want to stay in Seattle where he was identified in part with the collapse from 2007, would it be a smart idea? There’s rarely a clear answer to a question like that, and mostly it lies in what kind of contract it would take.

SafeCo Field would be a terrific place for Bedard to pitch and the new Mariner outfield would help to further deflate his ERA and possibly raise his strikeouts. There are some performance-based reasons for Bedard to consider sticking around. The Mariners aren’t likely to contend in 2009 and they clear a lot of salary off the books after this year, so having a reduced-price Bedard on hand for the fruition of a re-tool in 2010 might be tempting. Normally, you’d expect a breakdown here of Bedard’s projected future value and some solid analysis on what kind of contract the Mariners should be willing to offer and Bedard be willing to accept, but I think the projections, already sketchy enough for pitchers, aren’t going to be useful, so I am just going to leave it up as an open question.

Would you try to extend Bedard and if so, for how long/much? Would you try to lock him up before the season starts when he might take less or wait to see how healthy he is? Take whatever you can get in June/July? Let him walk at the end of 2009?

Though most of the offseason attention has been spent discussing where top-tier pitchers like CC Sabathia, A.J. Burnett, and Derek Lowe will sign, several hurlers capable of filling out the middle to back of the rotation were available. Daniel Cabrera became the most recent of these pitcher to sign, when he inked a one year deal with the Nationals. Tim Redding is currently seeking a two-year deal, and may very well receive one from the New York Mets. Another pitcher along these lines, likely better than Cabrera and Redding, is Braden Looper.

Looper, 34, spent the last three seasons on the St. Louis Cardinals. In 2006, he appeared in 69 games out of the bullpen, putting together a solid season with a 3.46 FIP. Looper moved to the rotation the next season, where he logged 175 innings while posting a 4.82 FIP. He did not exactly take the league by storm but had value above replacement level and made just $4.5 mil.

This past season, Braden earned $5.5 mil while recording a 4.52 FIP in 199 innings. With a slight bonus for pitching about 200 innings, Looper was a +2 win pitcher in 2008.

In 2009, Marcel projects Looper to be a 4.53 FIP pitcher in 170 innings. I think it is more realistic he will log closer to 180 innings. Let’s call him a 180 inning pitcher with a 4.60 FIP, which would result in 92 runs allowed. A replacement level starter with a 5.50 FIP in 150 innings would allow 92 runs. The replacement reliever would amass the remaining 30 innings at a 4.50 FIP, allowing 15 runs in the process.

This places Looper at +15 runs above replacement, and we can add another two runs as a bonus for pitching 180 innings. With these numbers, Looper projects to be a +1.5 to +1.7 win pitcher next season. At the going rate of $5 mil/win, Looper’s fair market value would be set at $8.5 mil, $3 mil more than his salary last season.

It is somewhat surprising that Looper’s name has not surfaced in rumors or reports as often as the likes of Cabrera and Redding. Considering the fact that he has proven himself better and projects more optimistically than either of the aforementioned pitchers, that only one report features Braden’s potential new location—Milwaukee—seems odd. How does Redding have several reported suitors yet Looper only has one, and that has not even been confirmed?

Regardless, whichever team ends up inking him to a deal will be getting a pitcher who, last season, showed a big improvement in his O-Swing%, increasing from 20% to 25%. At the same time, his Z-Swing%, which measures pitches swung at in the strike zone, dropped by an almost equal amount. His percentage of first strikes rose from 55% to 62% and he sustained a 51% rate of pitches thrown in the strike zone. Put together, he was able to increase swings on bad pitches and decrease swings on good pitches, while avoiding throwing more pitches out of the zone and getting ahead more often.

Looper may be 34, and he might not have the power potential of a Cabrera, or the potential cheap fee like a Redding, but he can definitely strengthen the back end of a rotation.

This afternoon, we started to look at the relationship between center fielders and infielders. While CF, like 2B, is considered a premium, up-the-middle position, and there are some truly excellent defensive players who man center field, we don’t see a lot of in-season crossover between center fielders and infield positions. Besides a couple of utility players, there’s a pretty clear distinction between infielders and outfielders and how they’re used in MLB.

Last year, at an event we held for USSMariner.com readers in Everett, we talked to former Mariners’ scouting director Bob Fontaine about the distinction between infielders and outfielders. He pointed out that there’s a significant difference in how the two release the ball on their throws, and that it can be fairly easy for an infielder to adjust to the long throwing motion of an outfielder, but it is very difficult for an outfielder to change back to the quicker, shorter arm motion required of an infielder. He pointed to this as the main reason why we don’t see many players float between the two spots.

The fact that there aren’t very many players who move between the OF and the IF supports Fontaine’s claim. However, that doesn’t mean there aren’t players who have made the move, and since the topic is of interest to me, I thought I’d take a look at these guys and how they’ve performed at various positions over the years.

Bill Hall is perhaps one of the best examples we can point to when talking about the various difficulties of each position. He came up through the minor leagues as a shortstop, and made his major league debut in 2002, playing both SS and 2B and getting emergency time at 3B. From 2002 to 2004, he was almost exclusively a middle infielder, but in 2005, J.J. Hardy and Rickie Weeks showed up, so Hall was moved to third base. He bounced back to SS in 2006 when Hardy got hurt, then moved to CF for 2007 when Ryan Braun arrived, and went back to 3rd base for 2008 when Braun moved to the outfield and the Brewers imported Mike Cameron.

Overall, Hall has amassed 800 innings at second base, 1,500 innings at third base, 2,100 innings at shortstop, and 1,000 innings in center field. His performance at the different positions are pretty interesting.

At SS, he’s got a career UZR/150 of +6.4. That’s very good. At second base, he’s -2.4, which is not at all what we’d expect (considering that SS are better than 2B, if he was a +6 shortstop, he should have been even better at second), and is probably just small sample size noise. But, the data still counts, so if we treat those 3,000 innings at SS/2B as a whole, we’d conclude that he’s something like a +5 second baseman/+0 shortstop.

If we think he’s a slightly above average defensive MI, then his +7.1 UZR/150 at third base is almost exactly what we’d expect. That helps confirm the suggestion made above. So, we have a pretty decent amount of data that suggests that Hall is a league average shortstop and an above average 2B/3B. So, how did he handle the adjustment to center field?

Well, according to UZR, he was simply average, +0.3 per 150 games. If this represented an accurate rating of Hall’s abilities in CF (and it may not – 1,000 innings is still a small sample for defensive data), then this would suggest that CF is more like SS than it is like 2B/3B.

Hall’s only one guy, though. How about some others?

Willie Harris came up to the majors in 2002 as a second baseman, and has played the majority of his career at the keystone position. However, as a speedy second baseman, he also was given a tryout in CF, and split his time between the two spots in 2004 and 2005. The Braves ended up using him in LF in 2007 and the Nationals followed suit in 2008, and he hasn’t played much infield the last three years. How has he performed between 2B, LF, and CF?

2B: 1,400 innings, -0.1 UZR/150. League average.
LF: 1,200 innings, +22.5 UZR/150. Among the best in the league.
CF: 900 innings, +10.3 UZR/150. Among the best in the league.

Harris is a guy who we’d look at as average defensively at second base and who never really sniffed shortstop. Unlike Hall, we wouldn’t have called him an above average middle infielder. However, he’s moved to the outfield and thrived, consistently posting excellent defensive numbers. Perhaps his skillset is just more suited to long strides and chasing down balls in the gap, but regardless, Harris makes it a tough case to argue that SS and CF are similar defensive positions, considering how successful he’s been in the outfield after a mediocre showing as a middle infielder.

There’s also Chris Burke, who we talked about on the blog last week. He came up as a second baseman and has performed exceptionally well there, ranking as a +10 defender in 854 innings during his major league career. He’s also been tried in all three outfield spots with widely varying results. He’s been good in the corner OF spots (+10 in 1,100 innings) and terrible in CF (-10 runs in just 498 innings). It’s hard to imagine that Burke could really be a terrific defensive 2B/LF/RF and an awful defensive CF, and the samples are small, so we can’t draw too many conclusions from his career.

Then there’s Alfonso Soriano, who as we all know was a pretty brutal defensive second baseman and got moved to the outfield in order to maximize his athletic ability. A career -8.8 UZR/150 guy at second base, he’s been 10 runs better than that in LF, racking up a +2.0 UZR/150 since the move to the outfield. This is identical to what the position adjustments suggested would happen, as there is a 10 run gap between 2B/LF on the spectrum. That he’s never been given more than a cursory glance in CF suggests that the Cubs believe that whatever problems plagued him at second base should keep him out of center field as well.

Hall’s career suggests that above average second baseman make average center fielders. Burke’s career suggests that above average second baseman make average center fielders. Soriano’s career suggests that below average second baseman make average corner outfielders.
Harris’ career suggests that his skills are just not suited for the infield, but that fast guys can be really good in the outfield, even if they aren’t very good in the infield. B.J. Upton and Adam Jones would agree with that.

Really, the only conclusion we can draw from all of this is that the infield and outfield are very different, and take very different sets of skills. Just because a player failed or succeeded at in the infield does mean that he will necessarily fail or succeed in the outfield, and vice versa.

The 2B/3B/SS pool of players has some players who could also play center field, but how many, and how well, we don’t have the answer for that yet.

The San Francisco Giants recently added four young hurlers to the organization’s 40-man roster: right-handers Henry Sosa, Joe Martinez, Waldis Joaquin, as well as left-hander Jesse English.

Of the quartet, Sosa has the highest ceiling thanks to a fastball that tops out around 95 mph. He also features a curveball and change-up in his repertoire. Sosa missed the first two months of the 2008 season after undergoing off-season knee surgery. He then headed to High-A ball – where he also made 14 starts in 2007 – and posted a 3.59 FIP with 62 hits allowed in 56.1 innings. In total, in 120 High-A ball innings in the last two seasons, Sosa has allowed 128 hits, in part due to his developing command. The 23-year-old showed improvements in his control by dropping his walk ratio from 5.09 BB/9 in 2007 to 2.88 BB/9 in 2008. His strikeout rate, though, also took a hit from 11.03 K/9 to 9.27 K/9. Sosa will begin 2009 in Double-A, which will be a great test for him and will help to determine if his secondary pitches will show enough improvement for him to remain in the starting rotation.

Martinez was originally signed by the Giants after being selected in the 12th round of the 2005 amateur draft out of Boston College. Despite spending four years in college, Martinez has moved through the system one step at a time, despite solid numbers in the low minors. Those stats included a 15-5 record in A-ball in 2006 and ratios of 1.99 BB/9 and 8.35 K/9 in 2007 at High-A ball. Part of the reason for the slow ascent is that Martinez’ stuff does not match up with his results. Although he posted a 3.09 FIP in Double-A in 2008, his strikeout rate plummeted to just 6.81 K/9, while his walk rate rose slightly to 2.25. The right-hander relies on solid command of his 88-91 mph fastball, curveball and change-up. Martinez is likely a reliever in the long run, thanks to a three-year drop in K-BB ratio from 5.19 to 4.19 to 3.03.

Joaquin, like Sosa, can dial his fastball up into the mid-90s and backs that up with a plus slider. His change-up, though, is lacking as a third pitch and he spent more time in the bullpen in 2008 than in the past. Joaquin spent the majority of the season in A-ball where he allowed 49 hits in 52 innings and posted rates of 5.12 BB/9 and 10.71 K/9. He also made nine appearances, including four starts, in High-A ball and posted a 3.87 FIP with 20 hits allowed in 19.1 innings. Joaquin should return to High-A in 2009 and spend much of the season working on his command and control.

English is the lone southpaw in the bunch. After an injury-plagued 2007 season, the 24-year-old is looking to make up for lost time and he had a nice season in 2008. In High-A ball, English posted a 3.62 FIP and allowed 121 hits in 135.1 innings. He also posted rates of 3.39 BB/9 and 8.98 K/9. The left-hander gets by with craftiness and deception, as his fastball does not exceed 88 mph. He also has a plus change-up, as well as a developing breaking ball. English could stand to induce a few more ground balls, but he has the makings of a solid No. 4 or 5 starter if he can tighten up his control.

Last week, we spent a few days talking about position adjustments, and specifically how 2B and 3B relate to each other in terms of defensive value. While there certainly wasn’t anything regarding a consensus reached (except for maybe that I’m nuts, which was a popular opinion among some), it was a worthwhile discussion, and one that I’m glad we had.

Today, though, I want to shift to talking about how center field relates to the 2B/3B spots and it’s placement in the middle of the position adjustment chart. Where do center fielders come from, and how good are they defensively?

Unlike second baseman and third baseman, a lot of major league center fielders have spent almost their entire baseball career playing the position. It’s the spot where they belong, because while they are excellent athletes with more than enough athleticism to handle shortstop, they come with one basic defect – they throw left-handed. No would deny that guys like Carl Crawford, Grady Sizemore, Denard Span, Juan Pierre, Darin Erstad, or a younger Johnny Damon had the speed, reactions, and athletic ability that would compare favorably to most shortstops, and they all are (or were, in Damon’s case) premium defensive talents. However, by virtue of throwing left-handed, they’re automatically excluded from the pool of potential 2B/3B/SS. Their positions are limited, thanks to handedness, to 1B/OF.

Of the 1B/OF spots, CF is clearly the natural landing spot for these plus athletes, since it has the largest quantity of opportunities with which to add defensive value. Not surprisingly, guys like Erstad, Pierre, and Sizemore have proven to be some of the best defensive outfielders in the game. If they were born as right-handers, there is a good chance all three would have ended up playing shortstop. These guys actually give us a pretty good proxy for what we should expect if we took a SS and moved him to CF, because for all intents and purposes, they are shortstops playing center field. By virtue of throwing left-handed, they were excluded from the SS pool, but they’re still premium defenders.

So, what about the right-handed throwing center fielders? Are they as good defensively as their LH brethren, or are they a collection of guys who were kicked out of the infield, such as B.J. Upton?

Interestingly, very few center fielders have backgrounds in the infield. Adam Jones was a shortstop in high school and the minor leagues, and we mentioned Upton, but as far as regular center fielders go, that’s about it. Carlos Beltran, Mike Cameron, Curtis Granderson, and Torii Hunter were all drafted and developed as outfielders, and there’s never been any thought of trying them in the infield, even though they aren’t excluded by their handedness and are definitely premium defensive talents.

Interestingly, MLB has pretty clearly laid out that infielders simply don’t play center field in their spare time. Last week, we ran through a pretty big list of guys who moved from second to third base with frequency, but there are only four players in MLB who played at least 50 innings at both SS and CF last season – Alexei Ramirez, Jerry Hairston, Alfredo Amezaga, and Willie Bloomquist. That’s one rookie who the White Sox were trying to figure out where he fit (since he didn’t come up through their minor league system) and three utility players for teams that weren’t contenders.

However, that could be simply a result of roster construction – teams carry four or five outfielders on their roster in a given season, so there usually isn’t a need for an infielder to move to the outfield within a given season. Do teams move players between SS/2B/3B to the outfield between seasons, when they’re putting their rosters together, and what do the results of those moves (or non moves) tell us about center field’s relation to the infield spots in the defensive spectrum?

We’ll look at those issues this afternoon.

Adam Dunn raised some eyebrows last week when he declared the Chicago Cubs as his top choice. Dunn backed his preference by stating preferential financial details as “fair”. Could it be that Dunn is the rara avis of sluggers, the one willing to take less money than his counterparts to play for his top choice? During the season, Dunn’s former teammate Bronson Arroyo speculated Dunn would seek a nine-figure contract. Excuse Dunn’s cupidity, because those hopes were prior to the bottoming out of the market. What exactly would a fair deal for Dunn be?

The 29-year-old had a solid offensive season in 2008 and produced 29.7 wRAA. Not quite as good as 2007 (36.2), but it wasn’t because Dunn didn’t hit homeruns. In fact, Dunn has hit exactly 40 homeruns four straight seasons, and more than 40 five straight seasons. Instead, the drop in wOBA and slugging percentage seems to be tied with a .262 batting average on balls in play. Roughly 18% of batted balls were line drives, which suggests Dunn’s BABIP is a bit unlucky. Consider that if Dunn’s BABIP was simply .299 (using the somewhat tired .120 + LD% method of expected BABIP) he would’ve recorded 12 more hits with 318 non-homerun batted balls. Even if each of those were singles, Dunn’s slugging would have jumped more than 0.02 points.

Defensively Dunn is poor. Over the past three seasons Dunn has recorded UZRs of -11.1, -14.9, and -10.1 in left field. Dewan’s +/- has Dunn worth -58 plays since 2006, or -46.4 runs, an average of -15.5 runs per season. Somehow PMR put Dunn in the positive. Positioning? Fluke? Who knows. That still doesn’t save Dunn from a negative average. Call it -10.

Marcels doesn’t seem to like Dunn too much, a .383 wOBA and 20.5 wRAA. I can easily see Dunn outperforming that projection, and I’ll say 25 wRAA, which could be a wee pessimistic. Dunn seems like a safe bet to get around 650 plate appearances, and gives us the equation necessary for projecting Dunn’s WAR, between 2.6 and 2.8, depending on whether you use 22.5 or 20 runs.

I called it 2.7 WAR and figured Dunn will get around a four-year deal. Depending on how you feel about Dunn’s potential decline, I have Dunn worth roughly 45 million. Now, let’s see if 11.25 annually is “fair” to the Dunn camp.

One of the big stories down the stretch in 2008 involved the wide array of Dodgers outfielders and who would receive playing time. Having signed both Juan Pierre and Andruw Jones to very lucrative deals, Matt Kemp and Andre Ethier soon emerged as true talents. Add in the acquisition of Manny Ramirez and the team featured five outfielders, three of whom deserved playing time and two of which who realistically did not but were being paid as if they did.

Jones has already mentioned a desire to be traded to a team on which his playing time would increase, and it seems Pierre is singing the same tune. The Mets were initially reported as having some interest, but Omar Minaya shot that rumor down. For any team to take on Pierre, the Dodgers would need to pay a large chunk of his remaining salary.

From 2001-04, Pierre was a decent player. He proved to be extremely durable, playing over 150 games and stealing 45+ bases in each season. He recorded 200+ hits in three of the four seasons, producing OBPs above .360 in the corresponding campaigns. His wOBA in those seasons: .353, .312, .335, .343. These translated to the following wRAA totals: 14.8, -7.4, 4.6, 8.1.

His fielding in these seasons made him even more valuable. As a centerfielder, Pierre’s UZR data from 2002-2004 pegged him as +17 runs, +15 runs, and +5 runs.

In 2005, Pierre’s wOBA dropped to .309 and his offense was worth -10 runs below average. His defense declined to +3 as well. The following season, his offense remained in the same vicinity at -8 runs. Playing in Wrigley Field for the Cubs, his defense improved to +20 runs while captaining the outfield.

In 2007, Pierre inked a 5-yr deal with the Dodgers, which made little sense given the top-tiered prospects in the farm system. Though he played 162 games once again, and slapped his way to 196 hits, Pierre remained around -9 runs below average offensively, and saw his UZR drop to +7. While +7 in centerfield is still very solid, Pierre’s offense concerned many.

Last year, the Dodgers decided not to play Pierre as often as he had previously played, and Juan partook in just 119 games. Overall, he produced a +0.7 UZR in limited centerfield action and a +0.3 in 84 leftfield games. His offense remained -8 runs below average. Essentially, Pierre had gone from a no-hit, good fielding player to a no-hit, average fielding player in 2008. While he may not have been a replacement player, persay, he tended to fit the definition with his lack of hitting ability and average defense.

Next season, we can project Pierre as a -10 run hitter and +5 run fielder. If he finds himself on another team, with plenty of playing time, an optimistic projection would peg him as worth +15 runs with adjustments for both position and value over replacement level. This is optimistic, though, and with limited playing time, his value could drop to anything from +5 to +10 runs. Even at 1.5 wins, his fair market value would not be worth more than $7.5 mil. Suffice it to say, his current contract will reward him with more than that fee.

If Manny Ramirez does not return to the lineup, Pierre will likely stay put, but if not, the Dodgers may end up paying a good portion of his salary to leave town. Without paying a high percentage of his salary, he simply is not an attractive option for other teams. At 31 years old, his already declining offense will continue to decline, meaning his defense will need to pick up the slack to keep him worthwhile.

He may still be a plus defender, but not the +20 fielder from a few years ago. Juan Pierre still has value, but not enough to merit his current salary or even earn him playing time on the team currently employing him.