For every ball that Gonzalez was thrown, it is true that it was a pitch he did not swing at, reducing his overall opportunities for an XBH. However, it increased the odds of the next pitch being one that he could hit for an XBH, because the ball leads to a better hitting count. ”

To extend this point, it also meant he got another pitch to swing at. If the previous ball had been a strike, or simply a swing-at-able pitch, Gonzalez possibly could have swung and achieved “only” a single or instead an out. I don’t know if total pitches matter, since a player can only put one of them into play. If a guy sees 5 pitches or 1 pitch, he puts the last one in play (or ultimately walks/strikes out). It’s the last pitch that matter, not the preceding ones that he did nothing with. Right?

There’s also an argument to be made that putting him in a better lineup may mean that he doesn’t get pitched around that often any more, but someone else will reap the benefit. (Essentially, if we’re positing that he was pitched around because his teammates lessened the value of his walk, and that when his walks have higher value he won’t get pitched around as much, there’s an inverse effect where other hitters were pitched around for the same reason, and now can’t be.)

Anyway, it will be interesting to see what happens.

I see nothing that diminishes his value in that.

In fact it probably enhances his value.

I get that AB is a fairly general substitute for much more specific data to which we now have access. I guess your suggestion of “pitches that could be hit for an extra base hit” would be best. Let’s call that XBH-P But because it’s general doesn’t, I suspect, make it invalid. Furthermore, there’s a couple of points that seem to support the idea that Gonzalez did, indeed, get more extra base hits per XBH-P. The first is the idea that pitchers were less likely to throw him a strike than in the past. If he’s seeing 56% of his pitches for strikes versus 62%, it would seem to follow that he’s seeing a smaller percentage of XBH-P, unless pitchers are throwing a much higher percentage of their strikes to the corners. Secondly, if we want to compare PA instead of AB, he did hit the same number of XBH in 20 less PA; probably within the margin of error, but on the right side of it nonetheless. Finally, and this I’m less confident in, if pitchers are truly issuing unofficial intentional walks, then wouldn’t in make sense that in those at bats he’s not getting XBH-P? Furthermore, while 2-0 and 3-1 are good hitters’ counts (and I agree with your point that he would see more of these counts), if a pitcher is really pitching around a player and doesn’t mind a walk, then it doesn’t seem likely that they’d throw an XBH-P here.

I think your specific hypothesis about walks is reasonable, interesting and no doubt satisfying because its contrarian.

But I question your more general hypothesis — that Gonzalez may regress generally. Consider:

(1) While it’s true he has only four additional homers and an added triple, he did do with just 89.6% of the at-bats he had the previous year. Erase those added homers and the triple and his isolated power was still significantly higher than in 2008 and that marked the fifth straight year Gonzalez improved his IPO. One could reasonably argue that such trends don’t continue indefinitely, but that’s a different argument than claiming there was no real increase in power in 2009.

(2) Gonzalez’s home/away splits has a dramatic effect on a range of key offensive measures including his walks. It appears the tendency for pitchers to pitch around Gonzalez was greater at home — he was walked far more often at home then on the road. (I don’t know the O-zone% splits but I would suspect he walked more because he was thrown more balls). If he walked more at home, by your own hypothesis, opposing teams calculated that a walk to him in Petco was worth less than a walk to him in other parks. It stands to reason, then, that if Gonzales were to be traded and play in a different home park, a walk there would be worth more than a walk in Petco. Simply put, in a park better suited to run-scoring and in a lineup more capable of driving home runs, a walk is more valuable. So while you reasonably argue Gonzalez would walk less, you fail to consider that each of those walks may be worth more. It goes without saying that he would hit more homers in most other parks. You suggest those homers might not hold the same value as those in Petco. Perhaps you are correct. But his walks would seem to hold greater value.

(3) Gonzalez’s Babip was lower than his career norm even though his peripheral stats (line drive rates, etc) were in line with that norm. That would suggest he was unlucky and that his Babip is likely to increase, and with it, his traditional offensive stats.

(4) As some others have pointed out he swung at fewer balls outside the zone so his greater selectivity may be at least in small part due to actual improvement in plate discipline and not strictly because he was pitched around (as you acknowledged to others)

Thanks as always for the provocative post. My knowledge of advanced stats is still rather limited but hopefully that didn’t handicap my analysis.

imagine player B swung away instead of taking those 100 BBs. as long as he doesnt make an out each of those 100 times, he will finish with a triple slash line better than player A. it doesn’t matter if it’s 100 BBs or 10 BBs. player A has better power and is a better hitter, even taking away the walks.

adrian gonzalez improved as a hitter, he didnt just substitute walks for outs.