Note: This is not in defense of Keith Law’s voting order. Please don’t confuse it as such because my points have little to do with how Javier Vazquez or Chris Carpenter pitched in comparison to each other throughout 2009.

Let’s get this out of the way before someone spoils it in the comments: I am a fan of Law. I do not always agree with his analysis but I find his takes interesting and usually thought-provoking if nothing else. The same can be said for Dave Cameron, Sky Kalkman, Rob Neyer, Tom Tango, and whomever else. Law and I have exchanged some emails over the years. He’s always been personable and honest. With that said, none of it comes into play with what I’m writing here.

Law made a decision on his National League Cy Young ballot that has blown up into something ridiculous. You have fellow BBWAA writers taking shots at him (after breaking BBWAA creeds by announcing the winners early themselves), you have at least one crazed Missourian searching for his home address, and there’s just a general sense of distaste for someone who didn’t make that big of a transgression on his ballot no matter what you use to judge pitchers.

Let’s consider a few things:

1. Keith Law worked in a front office.

Whatever you think of his job there or his credentials to land that job, he does have that experience. This doesn’t mean he’s automatically correct. What it does – or rather, what it would mean – if he (hypothetically) chose Rick Porcello for rookie of the year is that some of these people slamming him for the Cy Young pick would use his opinion in their arguments as an appeal to authority. “Oh, so you’re saying you with your fancy FIP are smarter than a former assistant GM? Hah, right.”

2. Other, less defensible, voting choices

Law’s perceived gaffe:

Name	Wins	IP	ERA	FIP
Vaz	15	219.1	2.87	2.77
Carp	17	192.2	2.24	2.78

The real mistake of the voting process:

Name	      W	IP	ERA	FIP
Greinke	16	229.1	2.16	2.33
Verlander	19	240	3.45	2.80
Hernandez	19	238.2	2.49	3.09

Someone voted Justin Verlander first over Greinke and Hernandez. If everyone is going insane and willing to burn Law at the stake for taking Vazquez’s 0.6 runs higher ERA then pass the tar and feathers and let’s get the sucker who voted Verlander first. Verlander is the same guy with an ERA nearly a full run higher than Hernandez and nearly a run and a half higher than Greinke. Can anyone tell me who made that vote, because I haven’t seen it anywhere, but go to Jon Heyman’s twitter feed and you’ll find quite a few Law quips.

3. Bias

The Law backlash isn’t merely from his vote. He’s a snarky internet writer and some perceive him as a holier than thou critic with a God complex. Even if you do think of Law in that capacity, why is he the martyr for supposedly “dumb” voting decisions? I am by no means a BBWAA awards historian, but using Baseball-Reference and Google I found two decisions that reek of far more incompetence than any ballot Law could create using the top four choices. Last year Brad Lidge and Francisco Rodriguez received first place MVP votes. Lidge actually received two. CC Sabathia received zero NL MVP votes. Let’s compare their numbers:

Sabathia (NL only): 130.2 IP, 1.65 ERA, 11 W
Lidge: 69.1 IP, 1.95 ERA, 41 SV

Did anyone ask Buck Martinez what he thought of those voters?

Whether you use WAR, WARP, ERA, or flip a coin, this isn’t the worst voting decision ever. Hell, it’s not even the worst of this awards season. For those members of the BBWAA (and please note it’s a select few) making a fracas over this when you stood silent in the past: shame on you. Any progress seemingly made on the Greinke vote is being undone because of sour grapes by folks hoping to keep the BBWAA an old boys club.

This afternoon, I mentioned that there may be an opportunity for teams to improve their rosters through diversification rather than purely pursuing upgrades. Let’s take a look at one of the specific opportunities and how this could work practically.

Atlanta, Left Field

The Braves want to upgrade their output for 2010, and the natural spot to do that would be left field. Garret Anderson didn’t produce at all in the position last year, posting a .305 wOBA while UZR hated his defense. They can certainly do better, and there are some big name run-producing outfielders on the market this winter.

However, they also have Jason Heyward, the best prospect in baseball, who happens to be a corner outfielder. He’s just 20 years old and has less than half a season of experience above A-ball, but his natural abilities and 2009 performance put him squarely in the 2010 picture.

There’s some real upside to handing Heyward the left field job and letting him run with it, but his projection necessarily has to include significant amounts of risk as well. He’s a classic high variance type of player, and the relatively high probability of failure drives down his expected value to the point where you can make a good case that he should be replaced, at least for 2010.

However, this is a situation where I’d argue for depth rather than replacement. Instead of bringing in an established player to perform at a level above what you’d expect from Heyward, the Braves may instead be able to bring in a player that allows them to minimize the cost of Heyward’s downside while still allowing them to give him an opportunity.

Randy Winn, for instance, is a low upside, low variance veteran that won’t command a large contract as a free agent. You generally know what you’re going to get from him – good contact, good defense, and no power. Having Winn on the team would allow the Braves to give Heyward a shot without bearing the full risk of collapse, as his steady but unspectacular production would serve as a stop loss if Heyward proves to not be ready for the big leagues.

By adding a player like Winn, the Braves minimize the variance that would be attached to giving Heyward a real look at the LF job. Removing risk in that way is significantly cheaper than doing so by pursuing a superior player with a steadier projection. It’s not free, of course – Winn will require some money to sign, and carrying both Winn and Heyward would cost the Braves an extra roster spot that consolidating into a better player would not.

In this case, though, I’d argue that the benefits probably outweigh those costs. A Winn/Heyward pairing in left field for Atlanta could provide a similar expected return to pretty much any of the non-Holliday free agent outfielders at a fraction of the cost.

This is just one example of a situation where pursuing depth is preferential to upgrading talent. Hopefully, it helps illustrate the point I was trying to make this afternoon. We’ll talk more about this next week, as we flesh out some of the issues that we didn’t have time to cover today.

Jim Thome hits free agency this offseason, after playing out the last season of his 2003-2008 (with 2009 vesting in 2008) contract. Injuries in Philadelphia and his eventual inability to play the field are among the reasons the contract probably didn’t work out in the end for the teams involved, but Thome has been a very good hitter when he’s been healthy.

How can Thome be expected to hit in 2010? Over the last four seasons, Thome’s wOBAs have been .420, .410, .370, and .367. Regressing to the mean and accounting for age, I estimate his 2010 wOBA at about .365, or about 21 runs above average.

Other (better) projection systems are already coming out with their estimate. I haven’t seen a ZiPs‘ projection for Thome (sorry if I missed it, Dan), but the CHONE projection is much less optimistic about Thome’s 2010 abilities than mine, having him at +9 runs per 150 games, or about +10 per 700 PAs.

There are two other important considerations with Thome: (1) his age and health and (2) his inability to play first base on even a part-time basis. Thome will by 39 at the beginning of the 2010 season. Despite all of this, from 2006-2008 he played in 143, 130, and 149 games. Even in 2009, he played in 107 games for Chicago before getting traded to the Dodgers, where he could not DH. While we should still be cautious in playing time projections for a 39-year-old who can’t play 1B because of back problems, given that, when he’s DHed, he’s been able to play pretty much every day, an 80% playing time projection doesn’t seem unreasonable.

Being a full-time DH obviously hurts Thome’s value. Only teams in the AL (and possibly the Nationals) will be interested. While normally we assume that a full-time DH’s value above replacement is simply his runs created above average, given that Thome has shown he can DH the last few years, we can use the -17.5/700 positional adjustment rather than -22.5.

Splitting the difference between projections (this does not mean I think my projection is in the same league), we get the following: +15 hitting -17.5 position + 22.5 replacement level times 80% playing time = 1.6 WAR player. We’d currently expect a team to give a 1.6 WAR player about six or seven million dollars on a one-year deal.

Is Thome really worth that? After all, a guy like Eric Hinske, whom CHONE projects to be a +6 hitter, and can also play a decent 1B, perhaps an acceptable LF/RF, and even an emergency 3B, would seem to be worth just as much. As a full-time 1B, with average defense, you’d expect him to be worth about almost as much as Thome over a full season, and at a much lower cost.

For most teams, Hinske would be a better investment. However, if there is an AL team that just needs the DH hole filled and is contending, given that Thome has proven he can DH, he would be the better choice. Whether he’s worth the extra money and if suitors recognize that is another question altogether. The recent awards voting has hinted at a change among the writers; will the market for older DH-types like Thome and Hideki Matsui demonstrate one among the front offices? Last season seemed to indicate so; it will be interesting to see if the trend continues.

Free agency started 10 hours ago, and as of today, teams are free to spend money in the market to upgrade their rosters. A lot of teams will do just that, selecting from the available pool of free agents to fill holes on their roster or replace players that don’t live up to their standards. This is the traditional way of improving the organization’s odds of winning – get better players than you already have. It’s generally a really good strategy if you can pull it off.

However, I think there’s an alternate path that may see some gains in popularity as teams attempt to keep their costs down during a tough economy. Rather than focusing purely on maximizing the potential positives, there is value to be had in minimizing the potential negatives. Let me use pictures to explain this better.

Here’s a sample win curve of the probable outcomes for a +1.8 win (roughly league average) player – the probabilities are made up to demonstrate the theory, though I’d bet they’re in the neighborhood of reality.

You’ll notice that this is not a normal distribution. The chance of injury make a disappointing outcome more likely than a breakout, so its not a traditional bell curve, but there are possible outcomes on both sides of the player’s actual talent level. The traditional replace-with-a-better-player method would lead a team to look for a guy who is closer to a +3 or +4 win player, pushing the entire curve to the right. However, +3 to +4 win players are expensive, and if you already have a +1.8 win guy on the roster, the marginal cost is probably going to outweigh the marginal benefit. In turn, you will not be willing to pay full price for those extra wins, and that good player will go sign with a team that has a giant hole at the position, thus receiving the full benefit of their talent level.

But there are a decent amount of teams that don’t have glaring holes on their roster, yet still want to improve their chances of winning. Rather than paying full price to upgrade from a +1.8 to a +3.5 win player, only netting +1.7 marginal wins in the process, perhaps there’s a more efficient way of buying wins, focusing on minimizing risk rather than maximizing return. Or, in graph form, doing this.

Rather than replacing the average player with a superior option, this new graph represents the result of simply having more options. This is a strategy to pursue depth rather than premium talent. It is the baseball version of diversification. Rather than pursuing a single, high-end player with a big contract that still leaves them vulnerable to total loss in case of an injury or inexplicable drop in performance, pairing different types of players can offer similar upside and risk at a reduced cost.

At 5 pm, we’ll look at some teams that may be in the position to do just that this winter

Aaron Heilman joined his fourth organization in the last 12 months tonight. Last year Heilman was part of a three-way deal that landed him in Seattle. Prior to the start of the regular season, he was shipped to the Cubs, and today he avoided being non-tendered and was instead sent to Arizona.

Heilman pitched in 70+ innings for the fifth consecutive season. He did a nice job putting an uncharacteristic 2008 season behind him. His FIPs over the past three years have been 3.86, 4.91, and 4.37, with the final two seasons coming with HR/FB higher than Heilman’s career average. He’s a slight groundball pitcher who uses a low-90s fastball, slider, and change effectively. Heilman has experience as a set-up man and the Diamondbacks seem likely to use him in the bullpen.

The return for the Cubs are a pair of minor leaguers.

Scott Maine is a stout lefty with impressive strikeout rates out of the bullpen. He’s 24-years-old and was drafted out of the university of Miami in 2007. Maine throws from a low arm slot and has a fastball that breaks into the low-90s as well as a slurve. The mandatory Tommy John surgery is out of the way and it’ll be interesting to see if deception is the key for Maine or if his stuff can hold up in the higher minors.

Ryne White is a short left-handed first baseman drafted in 2008 from Purdue. He’s shown the propensity to draw a walk but flashes few other skills despite a supposedly quick bat. He played some outfield in college and, given his height, there’s a chance he could return there sometime in the future.

Considering Heilman was on his way out for nothing, it’s hard to say the Cubs lose out on this deal. Maine might be a useful relief arm sooner than later, and who knows what the future holds for White. Obviously this isn’t an ideal situation, but at least they didn’t pay a marginal reliever seven million dollars today. As for Arizona, I’m not sure giving up anything of value for a middle reliever is a good play, especially given Arizona’s placement on the win curve.

Two days ago, the BBWAA ignored win totals and gave Zack Greinke the American League Cy Young award. Today, they did it again, giving Tim Lincecum the NL version despite having only 15 victories, the fewest of any Cy Young winner in the history of the award. Despite my long-winded explanation for why I don’t really care about the BBWAA awards, I feel like it would be silly to not give honor where it is due.

Congratulations to the members of the BBWAA, who have been willing to adapt as the game changes. They deserve recognition for being willing to accept the shift towards better analytical methods. And getting away from wins as a measure of the value of a pitcher is a big first step.

Five years ago, Lincecum wouldn’t have stood a chance in the voting. He might not have even stood a chance a year ago. But there are clearly members of the Writers Association who are not clinging to the analysis that they grew up with. It isn’t just that they gave Keith Law a vote this year. It’s writers like Larry Stone who have been in the newspaper business for 20 years and are helping to educate their fellow scribes.

Today, the BBWAA took a pretty big step back towards credibility. It obviously isn’t a wholesale change, and there are always going to be people resistant to any sort of change, but the shift is taking place. And it’s a welcome occurrence.

If they keep voting like this, I’ll have to start caring again.

Note: While the following isn’t technically a book, it’s very close to book-length. This was unintentional. On the plus side, Ken Arneson knows how to rock the mic right.

Readers will remember Ken Arneson both/either from the etherview that appeared in these electronic pages a couple months ago and/or the world-beating interweb sites — Humbug Journal and Catfish Stew — of which he was the world-beating author.

I wanted to address at least two issues with Herr Arneson (if not more). For one, I suspected that the invocation of “procedural memory” in my most recent post here was (a) ill-advised and (b) wildly inaccurate. I trusted that Arneson would right this egregious wrong. For two, I wanted Arneson to flesh out the comment he’d made on another post in which I suggest that Jered Weaver serves as an object lesson for the idea of flow, on account of how successful he is with such little velocity. He appears to be “trying easier,” I claim.

Ken Arneson responded in the comments section:

The “try easier” issue is just another example of the differences in the declarative/procedural memory types.

Muscle memory is procedural memory. That means it’s an automatic, subconscious process. If you try to induce conscious control over those types of memories, you’re rerouting the process through the wrong memory system, and you’ll likely mess the process up.

The conscious part of the process has to come in advance, in tricking the procedural memory system to automatically do what you want it to do when the time comes.

That’s why there’s no such thing as clutch, but there is such a thing as choking. You can’t make an automatic process any better, but you can avoid “thinking too much”, ie sabotaging the automatic responses with improper routing.

Arneson consented to be interviewed Wednesday by means of EtherPad, a program that allows multiple users to create and edit a document. Hence, the “etherview.”

Ken: Hej.

Carson: Really? Are there any “hej is for horses” jokes in Sweden?

Ken: Haven’t heard one, but there’s a bunch of good Swenglish jokes here (NSFW).

Carson: You had me at “Swenglish.”

Read the rest of this entry »

Congratulations to Zack Greinke not only for his Cy Young season, but his historically great season. For us here at FanGraphs, it is especially nice for a stat-loving guy to win.

Greinke throws four- and two-seam fastballs, a change, a curve and a slider. A couple days ago, Harry Pavlidis checked out his curve, and here I am going to look at his slider.

It is nothing short of amazing. On a total runs saved level, it was second only to Brett Anderson’s slider, which I profiled earlier. But Anderson throws his more often, so on a per slider basis, Greinke’s was even better.

Anderson’s slider was successful because it induced a ton of grounders (66%) and weak contact (slugging on contact of .435), but it got a below average number of whiffs (25% compared to 29% average for sliders in 2009). Greinke’s slider succeeded in the exact opposite manner. It gave up an above average slugging on contact (.502 compared to an average of .485), but gets tons and tons of whiffs (almost 45% of swings against his slider did not make contact). In fact no starter’s slider got more whiffs and only a handful of relievers’ sliders did.

+--------------------+-------+
|          Slider Whiff Rate |
+--------------------+-------+
| Mike Wuertz        | 0.503 |
| Brad Lidge         | 0.467 |
| Luke Gregerson     | 0.455 |
| Zack Greinke       | 0.447 |
| Jorge de la Rosa   | 0.430 |
+--------------------+-------+

Wuertz, of course, has an amazing slider, Lidge does, too, even in a down year, and Gregerson is surpinsingly unhittalbe. Then there is Greinke, the first starting pitcher on the list. He was the best pitcher of this year and one of the top performers of the past decade, and a huge part of it was his unhittable slider.

According to Paul Sullivan, the Cubs will announce later today that they have re-signed John Grabow to a two-year contract. Previous reports have put the value of the deal at $7.5 million.

Once again, we’re witness to the power of ERA as a negotiating tool. Over the last two seasons, Grabow’s thrown nearly 150 innings and posted an ERA of 3.09, giving the impression that he’s a high quality LH reliever. Yet again, ERA misleads.

Grabow’s FIP the last two years? 4.37, thanks to an atrociously high walk total. The entirety of his low ERA over the last two years is driven by an 82 percent rate of stranding runners, which is just not sustainable. He’s succeeded by putting men on base and then wiggling out of jams, but that’s not the same thing as pitching well.

It would be one thing if Grabow had developed this knack for stranding runners by elevating his strikeout rate, but he’s not any different now than he has been for his entire career.

Instead, he’s just posted artificially low BABIPs the last two years, and by not giving up hits, he was able to keep the guys he walked on the bases. That’s not a recipe for success.

Grabow is a generic left-handed middle reliever, the kind of guy you’re fine having for the league minimum but that you don’t really want to pay any real money to. He’s eminently replaceable, but the Cubs have decided to commit real money to him over multiple years because he has a low ERA.

The Cubs have money, and $3.75 million isn’t going to drastically alter their budget, but this is just a waste of cash. Betting on reliever ERA is a great way to get burned, and given Grabow’s actual talent levels, the Cubs are unlikely to be very happy with how this deal turns out for them.

Have you ever had one of those occasions where a trip down memory lane leads to acquiring a new piece of information? As you can guess, that is exactly what happened to me yesterday. While sifting through the bargain bin — also known as the minor league free agent list — the name Corey Patterson appeared. Memories of Patterson’s 2003 season. A season in which Patterson hit 13 home runs (he hit 14 in nearly 300 additional plate appearances the year prior), stole 16 bases (18 in 2002), and saw his ISO jump from the low-to-mid .100s all the way to .213 ended prematurely thanks to a knee injury.

Anyhow, curiosity got the best of me and I searched for his page on this very site. What I found was a bit surprising. In my mind Patterson has always been a solid defender. The scouting reports and UZR figures back it up; however, the degree to which he once scored is pretty impressive. Franklin Gutierrez produced one of the finest defensive seasons our UZR data has ever seen this year with a 29.1 score. In 2004, Patterson’s UZR was 24.6 while exclusively playing center.

Truth be told, Patterson has rated pretty well since that season too, but he’s never received as much playing time as he did then. His UZR/150s over the following three seasons were 11.3, 14.2, and 1.0. 2008 sat at 0.7 and 2009 has far, far too small of a sample size to say anything worthwhile. This is all from playing center. Patteron’s bat is lackluster. He doesn’t walk or hit for much power. He could be of some use as a pinch runner and defensive replacement for some National League team, though.

Frankly, I’m just disappointed I didn’t discover this earlier. When I attended a mid-June Nationals/Rays game I thought to myself that Patterson – then playing right – should’ve been in center instead of Elijah Dukes. Such is life.