Seattle and Baserunning
The Seattle Mariners’ inability to score runs is no secret. Entering Sunday’s affair with the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the club had played 91 games and scored 309 runs; a 3.4 runs per game average. The Mariners scored two runs (and won) but it took extra innings. So much attention has been paid (and rightfully so) to how Seattle prevents runs and not enough on how they score them – or rather, how they could increase their scoring without resorting to sinning such as rosterbation or promoting Dustin Ackley before he’s ready.
One of those ways is taking more risks on the basepaths. Not just stealing bases but the other aspects of risk in baserunning; namely attempting to take extra bases on hits. Take one of the most common situations in the game: a single with a runner on second base. As the runner runs the 90 foot path between second and third, the third base coach must make a quick calculation on ball placement, runner speed, the fielder’s arm strength and accuracy, the score, and the base-out state before deciding to put on the brakes or send the runner barreling home.
One of the ways we analyze when (or if) the Mariners should be taking risks on the basepaths is by looking at run expectancy charts and empirical data. Using a Markov Chain to generate a run expectancy table we can then figure out the break-even points for various out states surrounding the aforementioned situation. The Markov Chain gives us a BaseRuns estimated 3.9 runs per game figure for Seattle, one that actually happens to be on the high side when faced with reality. That’s because the Markov Chain doesn’t account for outs on the bases – it’s just not designed to do so. This is not a projection and there are no regression or adjustments made to the team’s numbers. Here is the generated RE chart for the Mariners to date:
They’re a low scoring team in a low scoring environment. Simply put: that means that making an out isn’t as taboo as it would be in a higher run scoring environment (almost anywhere else in baseball) because it would be unlikely that the runner scored anyways. On one hand, this means the break-even point for going second to home is lower than it would be for almost any other team in baseball. On the other, well, they aren’t scoring many runs. That’s a problem.
What I decided to focus on – since I only wanted a snapshot of the Mariners’ baserunning tactic rather than the entire montage – is when a single was hit and a runner was on second base. That doesn’t mean that baserunner was the only person on base. It also doesn’t mean all singles are created equal. Obviously there isn’t always a normal distribution of batted ball types or throwing arms in situations like these, but pretend for a minute there is. What we have below is each of the 12 situations where a runner could be on second base with a single hit as dictated by the state of outs recorded and other runners on. Those states are backed by the Mariners’ seasonal numbers through Saturday’s game; a quick key: Sent means the runner on second was sent home; Stayed means that runner was held on third; and Out means out at home. Simple enough, right?
The league average for sending the runner home is 63% — the Mariners wave runners home 61% of the time – while the league average success rate is around 93% — the Mariners’ success rate is a league worst 84%. As you can see from the above data they’ve made four of their eight outs with two away, good for a 50% rate. They’ve only made one out with nobody away (this play actually resulted in Ichiro being thrown out at home, which seems fairly uncommon) which matches with inherent rule of thumb.
Let’s look at this by success rate and break-even point, though, to see whether the Mariners should actually be running more on account of great success. Now, again, this is based on small sample size and is entirely discounting the throwing arm and batted ball type. It’s not a 100% perfect analysis by any means, it’s just a general overview of the situations at hand:
Based on this analysis, it seems the Mariners aren’t doing so bad when it comes to running after all. With nobody out third base coach Lee Tinsley is waving around 48% of the runners from second; with one out that number raises to 52%; and with two out that jolts up to 73%. Whether the Mariners discuss this with Tinsley or not — he’s actually their second third base coach on the season –, he seemingly has an understanding of the run expectancy matrix and how break-even points lower as the out count rises. As far as success rates per out; 90% of the runners sent with nobody out are safe; 82% with one out are safe; and 86% with two outs are safe. Again, Tinsley seems to get it. If anything, he might too passive with one and two outs, as all the break-even point supplied suggest he could get away with sending more runners, even if a few make outs.
So what of the league worst success rate? Well, remember, that isn’t broken down by outs or base situation. A team could perfectly understand that a success rate of around 50% with two outs is worth their gamble and have that take up 60-65% of their total attempts, thus skewing their overall results to look worse than it contextually is. The same is true for a team that just refuses to allow their guys to go unless there’s a 95% chance of success. Yes, it may look better on the surface, but in reality, that team is probably costing themselves a chance at some more runs by being too loss-adverse.
Note: Inspiration for this piece came from a Russell Carleton ESPN.com article and Jeff Zimmerman’s bit on similar issues with the Royals.
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I think your website blows and I’ll thank you not to spam it in comments lest you want to experience the wrath of a thousand suns.
If you have your own website, why do you need me to tell you what to think?
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It’s odd that, despite being internet-savvy enough to have mastered “Fake Link Creation”, you’ve never heard the saying “don’t feed the troll.”
Minnie didn’t really master the “fake link creation” as you can see if you hover over said link. Anyway, she (I assume she) was just trying to make the guy feel stupid for advertising his site. If it had gone ignored, there’s a good chance it would have happened again.
Really? A-Sor? Miggy-C? J-Bay? V-Dubbs? I was going to find something on your site to make fun of you for, but the front page is too offensively stupid for me to risk jumping further in.
Maybe they can stop overestimating the value of defense and stop viewing it as an arbitrage area by being “ahead of the curve” of most front offices. There is a diminishing return on the value of defense and while you can trade off offense and defense on an individual basis to model an individual’s value, I think there are significant issues when combining defense stats and getting to a team value, whereas offense seems (?) to translate better (and is more additive).
The other team built on a pitching and defense philosophy (Boston) is winning more via offense, so I think it’s time to seriously ask, is the defensive component in WAR overvaluing the value a team level gets from that skill? Have we swung from what was perceived to be undervalued to maybe a bit overvalued?
Haven’t multiple writers on this site argued that there is no such thing as diminishing returns on defense and that, “a run saved is a run scored” essentially?
Your point only holds true if you contend that the Mariners have SACRIFICED offense in an attempt to put a good defense on the field. They were ‘ahead of the curve’ in that they found a way to improve the team by a few wins while spending very little resources. They’ve been entirely focused on rebuilding the system as a whole, from Rookie Ball up. They’ve been able to improve the MLB product by spending cheap dollars on defensive wins while generally cutting back payroll and spending LESS resources on the MLB team.
From my point of view they have upgraded the offense when possible given the resources at hand. Obviously they want more offense, I just haven’t seen a lot of opportunities to acquire it – at least ones that they haven’t taken.
You could argue that they shouldn’t be cutting back resources and payroll and should have pursued some of the big FA bats over the last two offenses. I’d say that any contention we did in 2009 or 2010 was just a lucky byproduct, Dr. Z and his staff have been focused on the future from the beginning. And that will include offense, they just aren’t going to blow payroll to do it. What is the point in improving their odds in 2010?
last two off seasons*
“The other team”? THE other team? I realize there’s a tendency among some to believe that there’s the Yanks and Red Sox and then a bunch of teams that don’t really matter, but… really? Have you heard of the Padres? The Giants? Sure, no team has as little offense as the M’s, but a glance at Fangraph’s Team Leaderboards shows that there are six teams with higher fielding numbers than the Mariners, and a full dozen ahead of the Red Sox. And some of those are still in contention (those Padres and Giants as well as the Mets) despite below-average offensive numbers. The M’s and Red Sox may have attracted attention by announcing their “philosophy” but several others are successfully, albeit quietly, succeeding with it.
Can you provide actual data to substantiate this position, or is it more of a hunch and a handwave?
All I’m saying is while a run saved may equal a run scored are we really measuring (and valuing) runs saved on a team basis properly? Heck are we valuing it on an individual basis properly?
While defensive stats have improve drastically, improvement doesn’t mean they are as refined as offensive or pitching statistics. Yet people seem perfectly fine trading them off under the assumption that they have the same (or similar) degree of accuracy. Are there published error bars on WAR and more specifically the components that go into WAR? People use this as a tradeoff looking at various defense/offense combinations, but you can go to 2 or 3 different sites and get 2 or 3 different WAR #’s (and much of that variation appears to be on how defense is measure and weighted by various folks)
I spoke of the M’s and RedSox because that was the prisoner of the moment hype given to them to explain how they were building their teams (whether through FA or development). So instead of looking for a new area of improvement (baserunning), I was suggesting maybe the tradeoff between defense and offense is not as clean as stats seem to make it.
And you’re argument about the Pads. Mets and Giants is too convoluted – it’s impossible to say how much of their subpar offense is overcome by well above average pitching vs how much is defense, especially on a 1/2 year of defensive data.
Giants were 2nd in defense last year too.
It’s all about Aubrey Huff and Pat Burrell manning the corner outfield spots. Range-city.
You haven’t seen comedy until you’ve watched a game at the Big Phone with a Burrell-Rowand-Huff OF.
“It’s the wild kingdom defense. We got a panda at 3rd. A gazelle in center & a couple of water buffaloes in right & left.”
-Pat Burrell
Huff in right is especially a treat, between balls in triples alley and watching him try to play the funky bounces that come off the archways along the RF wall.
Range-Shitty
*grin*
“Huff in right is especially a treat”
I have trouble imagining he could possibly worse than Burrell in the field. I think it’s safe to say that no matter how bad he hits, he’ll never get the nickname “Pat the Glove.”
It’s funny: up until around five years ago, SABR didn’t seem to care at all about defense. The only thing that seemed to matter to SABR analysts was whether or not a guy drew walks and hit HR’s. Ever since they invented UZR, Run Prevention has become all the rage.
Defense obviously matters. However, it has to be a truly special defender – and usually either a middle infielder or CF – to make a huge difference on a team. UZR does, in my opinion, tend to overrate certain players. For example, in 2008, Ichiro and Adrian Gonzalez were both 3.9 WAR players. Ichiro had 213 hits – 180 singles and 33 extra-base hits – and compiled an 8.2 UZR. Adrian Gonzalez had 36 HR and an .870 OPS (in a severe pitcher’s park) and compiled a -3.6 UZR.
According to WAR, both players helped their teams equally. The prevailing consensus in SABR is “a run is a run, a win is a win.” I, however, am not certain that’s true. Adrian Gonzalez’ power bat in the middle of a lineup can turn a game around in one swing. Ichiro’s slap hitting and nifty fielding does not usually carry the same impact.
At least, that’s how I see it…
I think part of the reason there wasn’t as much talk about run prevention is because the metrics either weren’t there or weren’t developed enough to be more than minimally useful. While UZR certainly has its flaws, it’s generally a good enough way to identify outliers and guys who can make a difference with the leather, either positively or negatively.
UZR is still an estimate of how many runs a defender might be saving or costing his teams. Offensive metrics are still much more tangible than defensive ones. We can track how many hits a player got, and for how many bases. We can track how many runs he scored, how many runs he drove-in, how many times he walked, how many times he struck-out.
When it comes to defense, some plays are costlier than others. An error or misplay, depending on when it occurs, could cost the team six runs, or it might not cost them anything at all. Additionally, there are so many factors that come into play when it comes to defense. Maybe a player was not positioned well by his coaches. Maybe he lost the ball in the sun, in the lights, or there was mis-communication with another fielder.
UZR does a good job at estimating how many runs a player is saving or costing his team, but it’s still just an estimate. The SABR community is placing an awful lot of value upon this estimate.
Offensive plays are more valuable at some times than at other times, as well. A hard hit double off the wall with no one on may do nothing to help the team score runs. That same double with the bases loaded might turn the game around. So when offensive stats are compiled, they’re just an estimate of how the player helped his team score runs.
Context, just as with defense.
Amazingly, Ichiro and Figgins have been on base 275 times (at least), and have scored 73 runs.
Ichiro = 120 H + 30 BB, 35 runs (22 SB, 7 CS)
Figgins = 76 H + 49 BB, 38 runs (24 SB, 5 CS)
Their RBI leader is on pace to drive in 69 runs for the season. Wow, just wow.
They simply don’t save enough runs in the field. *grin*
I had to double check that myself before I believed it. Ichiro has only crossed the plate 35 times this season.
Running is not the answer. They need more Sluggers. As pointed out (beat me to it) Figgins and Suzuki have been on base 275 times and scored only 73 times. It was obvious to start the season that if Bradley did not have a big year this team was going to be in trouble, especially after letting Branyan walk and inexplicably releasing Garko for team chemistry (Sweeney and Griffey were the great clubhouse guys).
I predicted Figgins and Suzuki could lead the league in being LOB, and I was right. I did expect Figgins would get OB more, but how could I know they would have 2 position regulars who hit well last year switch positions, and not surprisingly, neither has hit. That’s always the risk when you ask players to switch positions, why, who knows? But I have seen it often enough to not be surprised by it.
Also, I am not so sure the fielding metrics like UZR are all about the players ability and not as much as the positioning (based on scouting and coaches) as well as the pitching staffs ability to execute pitches (command). If the team is playing a hitter to pull, and the catcher calls for an inside pitch, on bad pitching staffs you will see that inside pitch call get thrown outside and the hitter goes the other way. Seattle has pretty good pitching, and probably makes fielders look better than they are. .
Figgins UZR at 2B is worse than Lopez was last year, and Lopez is rated as good as Beltre (with Boston) this year, but not quite as good as Figgins last year (with LA). Maybe UZR is measuring more than the players fielding, and the team plays as much a role in these metrics as player for some positions.
It is hard to draw conclusions about the Mariners tendencies this season because of the two third base coaches. The reason there have been two coaches was because Mike Brumley, who started the season there, was bad at his job. That was why he and Lee Tinsley switched positions. Brumley made some stunningly bad decisions on sending people early in the season and had runners thrown out by several feet again and again. That is why the success rate is so low. Tinsley has not had this problem. Tinsley may or may not be too conservative but at least he is not running players into stupid outs. There is no way to tell anything statistically about his tendencies without running the analysis you did separately for each coach.
Following up on Hank’s argument about defensive statistics… Because so much work has gone into offensive statistics, we feel pretty confident that two +10 wRAA placed in the same lineup will together tend to contribute +20 wRAA. It’s not that individual results are independent, but that the statistics have been purposefully designed to isolate and measure individual contribution (unlike, say, RBIs).
I haven’t seen any evidence that the same can be said for the various defensive statistics. Do we know that an outfield of three +10 players is a +30 outfield? Suppose we had a perfect center fielder – the defensive contributions of the corner fielders would be totally inconsequential and the outfield would be worse than the sum of its parts.
I think this is definitely possible – that great defensive in multiple positions is redundant on a meaningful number of plays every season. If so, a team will gain fewer defensive runs saved than the sum of its players, and team defense is potentially overvalued. Or I don’t understand the defense component of WAR…