http://gameofinches.blogspot.com/2009/12/marlins-need-matt-holliday_28.html

“This line by Rivera is projected to be worth 2.4 WAR. So then is 2.4 WAR truly as good as a reliever can be? Probably not. That’s mostly because this measurement doesn’t account for leverage index. This certainly can be done, and it is done in some places.”

Maybe Dave is saying it can be included in some WAR calculations, but I also always thought it was not included in Fangraphs’ WAR. Jamie’s numbers above sure make it look like it is not included.

In 2009 Mariano Rivera is listed at 20.1 RAR and a WAR of 2 despite a pLI of 1.72. By comparison David Roberston is listed as 7.3 RAR a WAR of .7 and a pLI of .68.

I don’t see where LI is showing up in WAR at all. Could you help me understand what I am missing?

It seems more likely that the Rays made a misstep somewhere between trading Iwamura and trading for Soriano. This position seems to be reinforced by Dave’s previous article about diversifying, unless I’m missing something, which I may be.

In 08, Franklin was a big part of the BP that led the league in bullpen losses and blown saves … and it cost StL dearly.

In 09, Frnklin was much better, and was one of the main reasons why StL won the division.

’08 — 6 L — 17 SV — 8 BS — -0.4 WAR
’09 — 3L — 38 SV — 5 BS — 0.9 WAR

It’s kinda difficult for me to wrap my mind around the idea that Franklin’s difference in performance was only worth 1.3 WAR.

Franklin reduced his WHIP by .2 points (BIG improvement) and lowered his HR/IP numbers from 7.8 to 31 (IP per HR), and that made all the difference.

Another value one has as an effective closer is that the team has ONE guy that it can rely on, versus using the “committee” approach. Now, I don;t know how that translates in terms of actually “wins”, just that it’s a “comfort/reliability” type thing, and factors heavily in how the BP is used in games and throughout the season.

I think moneyball and BP have done a decent job educating the masses as to how closers *can* be over-rated and over-valued, but we also have cases of guys that were good as a setup man, but were unable to duplicate the performance once given the “closer’s” job … and we also see how effective reliable closers are in comparison to teams that suffle closers around, so there has to be *some* type of increased value for pitchers that do actually produce in the role of a closer.

This is so dramatic given the leverage of the situation and/or how we perceive it. A reliver in the 7th could lose the game for his team by giving up the go ahead run, but it doesn;t leave the immediate impact of a guy giving up a walk-off game-losing run, as a blown save is most probably a “loss”, when it was a “very probable win”.

Closers just seem to be a really “funny” situation. One thing I am more certain of is that pitchers don;t always perform the same in the role of closer as they do in the role of “reliever”, even though statistically we make that assumption (or at least I think we do).

The Rays had a billion infielders and no good relievers. Even though the number of potential WAR on the roster is now smaller, the number of ACTUAL WAR they receive should be larger, because Iwamura couldn’t really be squeezed into their lineup next season.

Decreased demand for free agents (when rebuilding teams don’t need them anymore) will decrease prices of free agents, which will make more free agents “bargains,” which will cause more teams to sign them.

Ultimately all the same guys will be playing baseball, except for a handful of uber-fringy Bobby Crosby type free agents who will be unable to get jobs at all.

If you want to reform the system so that players still get paid just as much but rebuilding teams will be willing to pay for free agents and playoff contenders won’t snap up every good dude on the market, you could subsidize and/or penalize signings based on team W/L records, so that, say, a team that won 60 last season only has to pay $2M per win while a team that won 100 has to pay $6M per win.