Variance in the question of to bunt or not to bunt is probably more important than the Expected Value of Runs in late situations and all you need is one run. Manager goes for the slightly surer probability of one run than the higher probability 0 runs and a slightly higher probability of four or more runs.

I understand that a sac bunt does not always produce an out and an advancement, however is that not the desired result?

If this is the case, why are we attempting to do something that, if sucsessful, will lower our expectancy? Unless, as already stated, we are dealing with a terrible hitter.

However I can never see doing it with a hitter like swisher. Especially in the 8 spot where your next hitter is Melky Cabrera.

A guy who is gonna slug 500 and get on base 38 pct of the time is not gonna bunt… why sacrafice one of the best bats on my team?

Also, the analogy to poker is ridiculous. In poker, one player is trying to get others to sweeten the pot by betting more money. Having the better hand is not as important as winning a big pot. In baseball, there are no stakes to raise. All that is at hand is winning the game. If a team thinks it can win with a successful sacrifice, they would be absurd to abstain so that some other manager in some other game might play their infield back.

Before recommending that I read a book on game theory, I suggest that you find a good one yourself and read it carefully. Amateur analysis like this gives sabemtrics a very bad name.

There is no other logic needed unless you are seriously worried about the other manager learning the optimal strategy from the way that you play.

As I said, the big mistake that many managers make – in fact, almost all managers make at least some of the time – is that they are convinced that a bunt is correct no matter where the defense is playing. IOW, they don’t mind letting the whole world know that they are bunting. That is almost always wrong, unless a pitcher is at the plate. That should actually be obvious even to a semi-astute manager. After all, they know from experience how difficult it can be to successfully bunt when the defense knows it is coming and they can certainly envision how hitting away can be particularly productive when the first and third baseman are standing 20 feet from home plate. That is the most common mistake made by managers. There should almost never be a time when the defense knows that a bunt is coming with a position player at bat (it is possible that if the batter is weak and is very fast and a skilled bunter, like a Taveras, that a bunt attempt has a higher WE than hitting away even with the defense expecting a bunt 100% of the time – possible) that a bunt is correct.

Preston, I don’t think that a base runner particularly needs to know what is coming, although may be helpful. As soon as he sees the batter square, he knows that is coming obviously. Plus, the batter can easily signal to the runner if he is going to bunt. Batters and runners often signal to each other.

Paul, no it would never be correct to just take the pitch (and fake a bunt), unless you were going to take the pitch anyway. In any case, trying to fake an astute opponent is generally not a good idea in any game. If your opponent is not astute, that is another story. However, you can usually only get away with that one time, at least versus that opponent.

When I play poker, unlike most other players at the table, I rarely say anything about the game and I try not to have any tells at all. However, usually one time and one time only, if a player or players do not know me, I try and “fake them out” on a hand. It usually works, but it only works once.

“In other words, wouldn’t an astute manager, assuming he’s ahead of the curve, utilize the “incorrect” strategy during less important games (the bluff) and utilize the “correct” strategy during more important games, i.e. game 6 of the LCS? You want the opposition to believe that you might make the “wrong” play by doing it at times, but it makes sense to only do it in games that are less important. Hopefully, the other team only picks up on the fact that you’re unpredictable.”

Chuck. Interesting. Sure, that could work, again, if your opponent is not that astute. Nice idea. There are a lot of things you can do in baseball (and in poker and other games) that make it look like you are randomizing your actions, but you are really not. Again, gotta be careful about that against an astute opponent.

For example, in poker, most good players change their approaches from time to time. Sometimes they play aggressively and sometimes more tightly. You should “change gears” on a random basis. But, most poker professionals recommend that after you have played loosely for a while, that you change gears and tighten up, and vice versa. Gotta be careful with that advice of course. And astute opponent can pick up on that. Let’s say that you follow that strategy and you have been raising a lot before the flop (in no limit hold-em) and I finally pick up a decent, but not great hand behind you. I want to re-raise you, thinking that since you have been raising so much, you obviously are raising on a lot of weak hands. But, if I am astute and you have been playing loose and aggressive like that for a while, I might also assume that by now, you may have tightened up in order to “change gears” so I may be less likely to re-raise you without a really strong hand myself.

Kind of like this: Let’s say that a lefty pitcher like Pettitte is on the mound. The only way I can steal against him is to guess and hope that he does not throw to first. If he throws to first, I am a dead duck. If not, I am probably safe. If he throws to first 35% or the time or more, on a random basis, I can never steal (at a greater rate than 65%, which is probably not enough to justify an attempt in most situations). But what if he just threw over 5 times in a row. If he is type who does not “flip the coin” after every pitch or every pick-off attempt, I may be able to go. IOW, he may think that after 4 or 5 throw overs, he is simply going to stop throwing over. He shouldn’t do that of course. But he might. He SHOULD be just as likely to throw over (35% of the time or more) as soon as I get on base as he is after throwing over 10 times in a row (which would be unlikely of course – but could and should eventually happen).

“With all due respect, stating that a decision is best made with a coin flip is pretty weak. While Win Expectancy does provide a good framework for making these decisions, the variables involved shouldn’t lead one to the conclusion that randomness is the way to go.”

I appreciate the “due respect” but with all due respect to you, you are wrong and I am right. You do not understand the concept of game theory. I suggest you read a poker book. The principles are the same. And re-read my original article above. It might click for you. Randomly selecting pitches, pick-offs to first, bunt attempts, pitch outs, steal attempts, hit and runs, etc. are critical elements to optimal strategies for a manager. They can be pseudo-random, BTW, although technically that is not optimal against an astute opponent. By pseudo-random, I mean that as long as they appear random to your opponent, that is generally good enough. In baseball terms, that is merely being unpredictable. You will actually occasionally hear some rare wisdom from a TV commentator when a batter is at the plate, the defense expects a bunt and the batter hits away, and the commentator says something like, “That is what makes LaRussa (or whoever) such a good manager. He is unpredictable.” Now, he (Tony) may have had a “reason” for not bunting and trying to “cross-up” the opposing manager, but for all intents and purposes, it was randomly selected, from the perspective of the other team.

Ken, sorry but you are missing the point of the whole thesis. Try re-reading the article. The defense must take a position on the field (in terms of how much they expect the bunt) such that the WE from bunting and the WE from hitting away is exactly equal (or as close as you can get). At the same time, the offense must bunt or not bunt a certain proportion of time, such that it doesn’t matter where the defense plays. If either manager does not do that, then the other manager can change their strategy, but NOT all the way because it would immediately or in the future cause their opponent to act more optimally. In order for the defense to play all the way in or all the way back, when the optimal position (where the WE from bunting and hitting away are the same) is somewhere in between, the offensive manager has to be really stupid. Ditto for the offense. If the optimal bunting strategy is to sometimes bunt and sometimes not, the defense manager would have to be really stupid for the offense to always bunt or always hit away.

“The other thing is, he’s saying that a manager should very carefully evaluate the situation, take in all the factors… And decide that this is a situation where bunting 50% of the time is the right choice. That 50% is a very detailed decision, which rests on the basic idea that not doing exactly the same thing every time in a given situation is generally a GOOD idea.”

That is correct. You simply cannot bunt or not bunt 100% of the time in any given situation (given the batter. pitcher, base runner, count, score, inning, park, weather, etc., all of which effect the bunt and hit away WE) unless one of two things are true:

1) If the defense is playing all the way back, the WE from bunting is still less than the WE from hitting away – you hit away 100% of the time. This may be true for very good hitters and/or slow, poor bunters. Also depends on pitcher, defense, and game situation.

2) if the defense is playing all the way up and the WE from bunting is still greater than the WE from hitting away – you bunt 100% of the time. This may be true for fast/good bunters and weak hitters. Also depends on pitcher, defense, and game situation.

In every other instance, you must bunt and hit away some of the time. Otherwise the defense will simply play all the way in (if you bunt 00% of the time) or all the way back (if you hit away 100% of the time), making it worse for you than if you bunted some of the time and hit away some of the time.

It is not about “making bad decisions” some of the time. It is about not allowing the opposing team to play optimally against you if they know what you are going to do. You cannot let them play all the way in if they think you are going to bunt or all the way back if they think you are going to hit away. Simple as that. If you mix up your strategy, they will be forced to play half way (for some of your batters some of the time – not all of them or all of the time). And that is better for you. It increases your overall WE. It is exactly the same reason why good poker players must bluff sometimes and must play all of their hands differently in a random fashion. You cannot let your opponent have a good idea what you have by the way you play your hand.

“How much do teams give up by not letting the players choose their strategy based on where the defense is positioned?”

Depends. If the defense is playing in a position such that WE from bunt = WE from hitting away, it does not matter whether you know that before your decision is made. There is nothing you can do to exploit that – that is why it is an optimal position for the defense. However, if the defense makes a mistake and you don’t know that they will before you have to make your decision, then it is a big advantage for the offense. So the answer is that it is POTENTIALLY a big advantage to see the defense first, depending on how often and by how much the defense errs and whether you could anticipate those mistakes even without seeing them first.

Even if the offense wants to make their decision before they see the defense (they don’t want to let the batter decide or give him an option or a re-signal), that is fine. You still have to randomize your offensive strategy with some batters in some situations. You can either assume that the defense will play optimally or you can assume some mistake (if you have reason to think they will) and respond accordingly.

As I said, if the defense makes a mistake, even a little one, by playing too far in or back, your correct response for that one PA only, is technically to always bunt or not bunt, but you can’t do that. As soon as the other manager sees you doing that surely he is going to make sure he doesn’t make that same mistake again. For example, if he plays all the way back with Swisher at the plate thinking that you are not going to bunt Swisher, and you bunt him 2 or 3 times in a row (or even once), surely he is not going to play back the next time Swisher is up at bat in a similar situation, or even some other batter that he previously thought you would not bunt with.

Have you played poker? This is exactly what a bluff is.

Theoretically, if the value of the “bad decision” is less bad than any future benefits it leads to, then yes, it makes sense to make some bad decisions. I don’t know if practically that happens in this situation, but there are at least situations it makes sense. For example, compare it to pitch selection. Not all pitches a pitcher throws are equal. The pitcher will make the decision sometimes to throw a worse pitch (which is akin to the “bad decision” you brought up). In the long run it’s a good decision, though, because his other pitches are more effective if he mixes this pitch in at times. The positive effect of making the other pitches more effective is greater than the negative effect of throwing a worse pitch. If it’s not, the pitcher will simply stop throwing the pitch altogether.

As I said, I don’t know for sure if this is the case with bunting, but just from a thoeretical standpoint I don’t see how you can dismiss mixing it up without any evidence it never makes sense…