In a move that will shake up the NL West, nay, the entire National League as we know it, the Kansas City Royals have reportedly traded outfielder Scott Podsednik to the Los Angeles Dodgers for minor leaguers Lucas May and Elisaul Pimentel. The Dodgers will reportedly pick up the $650,000 dollars still owed to Podsednik, whose initial signing by the Royals during the off-season inspired some jackass on the internet to hypothesize a ‘Contest‘ between Dayton Moore and Omar Minaya to match foolish move for foolish move.

It must be admitted that Podsednik has played better than expected, accumulating 1.2 WAR in 94 games for the Royals, although the playing time (replacement) element is inflated due to the Royals hitting Podsednik first for most of the season (14.3 replacement runs versus 11.3 total runs above replacement means he was still a below-average player). Sure, his defense in left field was average at best according to UZR (-1.5), DRS (-12!), and to anyone who watched his …circuitous… routes (one of the most frustrating parts of Rick Ankiel being out for so long only to have Pods get traded right as Ankiel returned was that we missed the inevitable collision). Over the rest of the season, playing full-time, one would expect Podsednik to be worth roughly a half-win above replacement level, although how much playing time he gets will be contingent on when Manny Ramirez and Reed Johnson return from their respective injuries. Assuming full-time play, a half win is probably worth about $2 million dollars. Minus the $650,000 owed to Podsednik, the surplus is roughly the market value of a C prospect.

I’ll defer to others regarding the prospects that the Dodgers are sending to Kansas City. I’ve read both May and Pimental described as “fringe,” although John Sickels called May (a catcher with a decent bat but defensive issues) a “C” prospect during the past off-season, which would make this potentially a minor win for the Royals, although given the Dodgers’ situation (a contender with injuries to multiple outfielders) either way it seems to be a fair trade for both sides.

While Podsednik has played better than should have been expected for the Royals and thus justified his low cost in a vacuum, it was still not a smart signing for the Royals, given that even with Podsednik’s not-horrible play he’s still a below-average outfielder in his mid-thirties who wouldn’t exactly have taken the Royals to a new level. Moreover, one also has to take into account the opportunity cost the Royals gave up “showcasing” Podsednik while Mitch Maier sat on the bench and newly-minted outfielder Alex Gordon rotted in AAA. But that’s all water under the bridge. Although it is unlikely that Mays or Pimental will amount to much, it is still a decent return to get due to a fortuitous confluence of a (typical) BABIP-fueled July by Podsednik and the Dodgers’ outfield problems (Juan Pierre apparently isn’t available, no doubt much to Ned Colletti’s chagrin). It doesn’t make up for, well, you know… but it would be churlish to deny that this was nice work by Dayton Moore.

I’m intrigued, Dayton. For your next tricks, I suggest a) convincing another team that Rick Ankiel is worth something (even if only taking on his salary); and b) resisting going after the Big Prize.

The 2010 Seattle Mariners have, to put it mildly, not quite lived up to pre-season expectations. A full post-mortem can wait until after the season, along with the attendant I-told-you-sos and other fun. Rather than focusing on what went wrong with the Mariners and why some people were wrong about them (including me — I didn’t think they’d win the division, but I thought they’d be around .500), I’d simply like to focus on a sentiment I encountered recently: that the utter collapse of the 2010 Mariners proves that the recent emphasis on defense (as exemplified by the Mariners’ personnel decisions) shows that fielding to be “overvalued.”

There are a number of related complex issues: the objectivity of recent defensive metrics, the difficulty of projecting defensive performance based on those metrics, integrating that data with scouting information, and so on. These are all important and should not be ignored (See here and here for some good recent work). For now, I want to deal with polemically the most basic claim: that the 2010 Mariners in themselves somehow show that pursuing players based on their apparent value in the field is a “flawed” strategy. We aren’t discussing whether or not current defensive metrics are good or not (after all, one could pick good defensive players based on scouting reports), or whether the Mariners picked the right players. Those are important, but I’m starting with the more simple issue of whether “defense is overrated.” Perhaps this is a straw man, but I think it’s one that at least needs to be cleared out of the way before more serious discussions can get underway.

The most obvious answer, of course, is that a run saved is still as valuable a run earned (generally speaking). Unless the Mariners or any other team emphasizing defense is likely to score zero runs a game (and if the 2010 Mariners didn’t accomplish that, I’m not sure who could, but more on that later), run prevention in general is a perfectly sound strategy. Moreover, one team failing to win through this strategy hardly “proves” anything. If it did, well, the San Diego Padres are winning the NL West against almost everybody’s expectations, and, what do you know, they currently lead the league in fielding runs saved according to UZR. So there.

While the Mariners’ fielders haven’t performed as well as expected, that they’ve been good (about 14 runs above average according to UZR) while the team has failed to win is the sort of thing that one might point to when saying that “defense is overrated.” Except, of course, that people have forgotten the one thing that everyone knew would be a problem for the 2010 Mariners: scoring runs. Again, this is not a full evaluation of what the Mariners could or should have done differently in putting the team together, but rather a look at what is happening right now. And right now, the Mariners have the worst team wOBA in the major leagues at .289 (league average is around .325).

To match some faces to this offensive futility, here are the current wOBAs of the 10 Mariners with the most 2010 plate appearances so far. In parentheses, I’ve included each player’s preseason Marcel projection, since that is the simplest projection system and gives a sample of what one might have reasonably expected from each hitter based on recent seasons:

Ichiro Suzuki .330 (.346)
Chone Figgins .293 (.344)
Jose Lopez .265 (.321)
Franklin Gutierrez .313 (.332)
Milton Bradley .289 (.372)
Casey Kotchman .289 (.334)
Josh Wilson .298 (.293)
Michael Saunders .331 (.313)
Jack Wilson .265 (.305)

Whoever you want to blame (or not blame), that is simply stunning. But I’m dancing around the issue: the point was not whether the Mariners should have seen this coming (on offense or defense), but rather whether this team’s actual performance shows that defense has been overvalued. Even if one thinks that a single season by a single team “proves” anything, I don’t think you can go much further than this: it doesn’t matter how good a team is on defense if they hit worse than Jason Kendall (.290 wOBA as of today).

I suppose it was predictable. If anyone had asked before the season, “who will be two most valuable outfielders in the National League the week of the trade deadline?” I think most analysts would have agreed on two names: Matt Holliday and Andres Torres. Why even look at the leaderboard?

But seriously: Andres Torres?

Drafted in 1998 by the Detroit, Torres never really lit up the Detroit system, and was granted free agency in 2004 after only a couple hundred major league plate appearances. He bounced around several organizations’ systems, but his only pre-2009 major league action consisted of 21 PA for the Rangers in 2005. While he hit pretty well for the Cubs AAA affiliate in 2008, it was still the minor leagues, and he was 30 years old at the time — hardly the sign of someone who might be useful in the majors.

The Giants signed Torres to a minor league contract before the 2009 season, and Torres surprised by not only playing good outfield defense (primarily in center and right), but hitting the ball quite well, sporting a .379 wOBA (.270/.343/.533) in 170 PA. It wasn’t primarily BABIP-fueled as if often the case, as one can see from his impressive isolated power (.263) and above-average walk rate (9.4%). Still, over 170 PA just about anything can happen — observed wOBA is regressed halfway to league average at about 220 PA, which is a more sophisticated way of saying that Torres 170 PA of impressive offense told us less about his true talent, statistically, than just guessing he was a league average hitter. So it was understandable that Torres didn’t figure heavily in the Giants off-season retooling.

More than halfway through 2010, the 32 year-old Torres is at it again, getting 356 PA so far due to Mark DeRosa‘s injury situation and the continuing disaster in center that is Aaron Rowand. Torres is smoking at the plate with a .378 wOBA (.274/.365/.492). Once again, there’s little or no obvious BABIP luck here, Torres continues to hit for power (.218 ISO) and has not only increased his walk rate (to 11.1%) but has decreased his strikeout rate. His plate approach was decent in 2009, but discipline has improved in 2010 with less swings at balls outside the zone and better overall contact. As for his excellent defensive ratings, it’s far too small a sample to garner much about his true talent based on UZR alone, but the 2009 Fan Scouting Report seems in to indicate he’s for real in that regard.

What do we make of all this? Preseason projections certainly didn’t see this coming: CHONE projected a .318 wOBA, and ZiPS saw a .315. ZiPS RoS (which takes into account the current season’s performance) sees a .339 wOBA from Torres the rest of the season, which is above average, but a far cry from his current performance. This is not mean to “show up” these projections systems, whose creators hardly claim infallibility; moreover, there was precious little data from recent major- or minor-league performance that would suggest that Torres’ offensive true talent was even close to .378 wOBA.

To be honest, there still isn’t. While Torres may have more than twice as many PA in 2010 as he did in 2009, that does not mean that we have “twice the certainty” regarding his observed performance’s relation to his true talent level. Statistics don’t work that way. The updated projections from ZiPS and CHONE may not be your cup of tea, but I’ll take them over my own opinion. You may trust your own scouting eye better than I do mine (and honestly, who could blame you). While this isn’t a case of BABIP gone wild, random variation can go beyond just that, and there have been other massive deviations from true talent much larger and longer-sustained than the gap between Torres’ current performance and his projections.

Whatever the case may end up being, this post is not meant to be deflationary towards what Torres and the Giants have achieved so far this season. For as much (justified) criticism as the Giants front office receives, it must be admitted that in cases like Aubrey Huff, the Giants were right and many of “us” were wrong. But before being impressed with Aubrey Huff (who has been excellent), spare a moment for the NL’s second-most valuable outfielder so far in 2010: Andres Torres.

Last week, David Ortiz expressed his desire for a multi-year extension from the Red Sox. After a down season in 2009 and a dreadful start to 2010, Ortiz’s bat has come around, and he is currently hitting .256/.376/.538 (.384 wOBA) on the season. Ortiz says he doesn’t want to deal with the uncertainty of a one-year deal, a clear reference to his current situation, as the Red Sox hold a $12.5 million dollar club option for 2011 with no buyout. It might annoy some people for Ortiz to complain not-so-subtly about a contract to which he himself agreed, but that’s the nature of these things. To invoke the inevitable cliché: it’s a business.

Putting aside the notion of a multi-year deal, what about that club option? Let’s begin with one reminder: while Ortiz is in his mid-thirties and in 2009 (particularly the first half) performed abysmally, Marcel and the other projection system rightly see one year as a relatively limited sample. Prior to the start of 2010 only ZiPS saw Ortiz comeing close to his current production (projecting a .380 2010 wOBA), but neither Marcels nor CHONE saw Ortiz’s bat as dead, both projecting him for the mid-.360s — not his usual standard, but still useful even at DH. Where does Ortiz’s projected true talent stand now? ZiPS updated RoS projections see him as a .383 wOBA hitter, or about +25 runs over a full season. CHONE’s July 1 Update has him as a +23 hitter at the moment. once adjusting for position and replacement level, 2.5 WAR a season seems to be the appropriate estimate for his likely true talent — a very good hitter with no position; a bit above average as a player overall.

But what about 2011? Ortiz turns 35 in the off-season, and is carrying a piano on his back, as Bill James once wrote of Mo Vaughn. Nonetheless, let’s simply attribute to him the standard 0.5 win-a-season decline due to injury risk and skill attrition, making 2 WAR is a fair estimate of his projected 2011 value. If each marginal win is worth 4 million dollars on the open market this season, and we assume a 10% inflation, then he’s likely worth about nine million on the open market next season — more than three million dollars less than his club option. Even if one assumes that the cost of a marginal win will inflate by 25% next season (to five million dollars), he still would be overpaid. If one assumes the 25% inflation and no decline from the massive slugger in his mid-30s, $12.5 million would be a market-value deal, but that’s not the kind of thinking that made Boston’s front office one of the best in baseball.

Now, if Ortiz were to agree to a multi-year contract at a lower annual salary, that might work out for the Red Sox. That doesn’t seem like a likely scenario, however, given that players rarely go for pay cuts. Boston does have the second-largest payroll in baseball, but they they don’t usually fill it with excessive or sentimental contracts. They might want to pursue Prince Fielder in the off-season (assuming he’s available from the Brewers or whichever team he’s on at that point) or perhaps they can revisit their seemingly never-ending (and long-rumored) quest for Adrian Gonzalez. Whatever the case may be, in the wake of the glory he brought to the franchise through his Home Run Derby victory, the Red Sox should plan on honoring at least the first part of Big Papi’s wish during the coming off-season by freeing him from his 2011 club option.

After consulting the masses via Twitter, today I am going to share eight (very) loosely related thoughts regarding Adam Dunn:

1. Tired Dunn Talking Point A: Despite strikeout numbers that make traditionalists cringe, Adam Dunn is an outstanding hitter, sporting a .398 wOBA since 2008.

2. Tired Dunn Talking Point B: Despite being a tremendous hitter, Dunn’s defense both in the outfield and at first base, according to defensive metrics as well as scouting reports, is so dreadful that it seriously compromises his overall value, particularly in the NL where he cannot be DHed.

3. According to WAR, Dunn might be on the way to having his the best season ever, having compiled three Wins Above Replacement already. Of course, there’s still plenty of season to go, and we’re too smart to fall for “on pace” claims, right?

4. From 2004 through 2008 Adam Dunn hit 40 or more home runs every season, and hit exactly 40 each season from 2005-2008. He hit 38 last season. Yet Dunn has never participated in the Home Run Derby. While this is probably due to the way that invitations are distributed, isn’t it more than a bit weird that Brandon Inge has been in the Home Run Derby and Adam Dunn hasn’t?

5. Dunn has had classic “old player skills” from almost the very beginning of his major league career: defensive limitations, lack of speed, low batting average, great power, high strikeout rate, high walk rate, etc. But at 30, the offensive decline the older player skills theory would have us expect has, shall we say, remained “well-hidden” in Dunn’s case:

This doesn’t refute the general notion of old player skills. Nor does it mean that Dunn should not be expected to decline soon (one should expect that from most in their 30s). It is simply interesting.

6. Curiously enough, Dunn seems to be “reneging” a bit on his geezer skills status this season: his current .288 batting average is higher than it has ever been over a full season. While his strikeouts are as frequent as ever, his 2010 walk rate of 10.9% is by far the worst of his career. Bizarrely enough, the relatively high batting average has occurred in a season that Dunn’s swings are making less contact (69.6% contact rate) and he is swinging at more pitches outside of the zone than ever before (28.8% O-Swing versus 17.8% career). If I didn’t know better, I’d be tempted to think that loosening up his plate discipline has enabled Dunn to find a Fountain of Youth.

7. Despite Dunn’s efforts, Ryan Zimmerman‘s all-around excellence, and the coronation of Stephen Strasburg, the Nationals are out of it. Trading Dunn, who is a free agent (likely Type A) after the season, is the logical choice. While there have been rumors of mutual interest between Dunn and the Nationals regarding a multi-year extension, those are dying down, fortunately for Nationals fans. While Dunn has aged gracefully so far (at least at the plate), given that the team is (optimistically) at least two years away from contending, a big long-term deal for any should-be DH in his early 30s, old player skills or not, is usually a bad idea, especially for an NL team.

8. ZiPS Rest-of-Season projections see Dunn as about a +18 hitter over the remainder of the season; let’s call him 2 WAR overall for the rest of 2010. He is probably owed between five and six million dollars for the rest of his contract, so unless Washington eats a substantial portion of his contract, there’s probably only three million dollars worth of projected surplus here — not bad, but probably not worth much more than a decent “C” prospect or two with some upside. However, because Dunn will likely be a Type A free agent in the offseason, draft pick compensation for the team offering him arbitration (assuming he turns it down) bumps the total projected surplus up to around nine million dollars, which means “B” prospects (plus filler) should definitely be in play.

Pretty much everyone loves Joe Posnanski, including me. But while “Poz” has been perhaps the most prominent advocate of objective analysis among “mainstream” sportswriters, few would call him a “radical.” His blog post today, in the aftermath of a series of Tweets and counter-Tweets regarding Matt Thornton‘s appearance in last night’s All-Star Game, however, paints a different picture. While he doesn’t explicitly say so, Posnanski implicitly has a pretty radical idea about what sort of pitcher belongs (and does not belong) in the All-Star Game.

While acknowledging that Matt Thornton is a good middle reliever, Posnanski does

not want to see a middle reliever, no matter how good, pitch with the game on the line in the All-Star Game. I just don’t. I’m not necessarily overjoyed by the way managers use their staffs, but I know the realities of the game — managers put their best pitchers in the rotation, and they put their best reliever in the closer role, and they take the best of the rest (or the young pitchers they are trying to break in) and put them in middle relief. Some thrive in that role. And their value tends to be undervalued by everyone … including me.* But that doesn’t make it interesting in any way.

This is set up by this perfectly reasonable point:

Middle relief is a specialty position. It’s extremely important in day-to-day baseball, but, to me at least, the All-Star Game is not day-to-day baseball. It’s a game for the best. And in a league that has Lee, Liriano, Lester, King Felix, Verlander, Price, Greinke, Weaver, Sabathia, Pettitte and many other great, great starting pitchers, I’m sorry, I don’t want Matt Thornton pitching in the most important moment of the game. I don’t buy that having that “experience” of pitching the seventh inning with runners on is of great value, not in this kind of game. Give me the best pitcher.

Poz is right: we want to see the best pitcher out there, and we know that relief pitchers are generally relievers because they aren’t good enough to start. Yes, most fans would rather see Zack Greinke or Jon Lester than Matt Thornton — they are better pitchers than Thornton.

The “experience” point is also excellent, and pushes this idea over into the “radical” category. After all, if the “‘experience’ of pitching the seventh inning with runners on” isn’t important in the All-Star Game, then really, why would “experience of pitching in the ninth” be any different? The “experience” issue is a major part of the basis for modern closer “position,” one of the myths that sabermetric analysis has been debunking for a while. Closers do what they do because, just like every other reliever, most of them couldn’t handle starting for some reason or another. This gets at the heart of Posnanski’s implicit radicality: if we want to see the best pitchers, why should any relief pitchers make the All-Star Game?

If we agree with Posnanski that Matt Thornton isn’t good enough to pitch in the All-Star Game, which relievers are left? Among qualified relievers 2008-present, only two had a better FIP than All-Star Scourge Matt Thornton (2.50): Jonathan Broxton (2.13) and Mariano Rivera (2.36). Has Thornton been lucky on home runs? Here is an exhaustive list of qualified relievers with a better xFIP than Thornton (2.84) 2008-present: Broxton (2.32) and Rivera (2.57).

Of course, Rivera and Broxton are both “proven closers,” but even if you buy that load of “clutch” nonsense (you shouldn’t), as Posnanski pointed out, that kind of “experience” shouldn’t matter in the All-Star Game. In any case, leverage accounts for just how important the situations in which the pitcher has been placed in have been. Wins Above Replacement (WAR) helps us properly value “mere specialists” by incorporating leverage into their valuation as well as how much they’ve pitched. Since 2008, Matt Thornton has accumulated 5.9 WAR. Which relievers are ahead of him? You guessed it: Jonathan Broxton (6.9) and Mariano Rivera (6.4).

Maybe guys like Rivera and Broxton could make an appearance in the All-Star Game, if all the starters were used up or something, but hey, if we don’t want to see Matt Thornton, one of the most valuable relievers (middle or otherwise) in the game over the last few seasons, what’s the point of having relievers on the roster at all? Heck yeah, I’d rather see King Felix pitch than Matt Thornton. I hope Posnanski uses his prominent position to advocate for the position logically implied by his arguments.

However, I suppose in one way Posnanski should probably be happy that Matt Thornton was the reliever inserted into the game. Can you imagine the backlash Posnanski would have endured from Royals fans in his hometown of Kansas City if he’d tweeted about the silliness of Joe Girardi putting in Joakim Soria, someone Thornton has clearly outpitched the last several years?

A little over half way through the season, the Minnesota Twins, favored by many to win the American League Central relatively easily, are in third place. Their run differential indicates that they “should” be winning the division, something that will hopefully be noticed by Ron Gardenhire’s fan club (which includes some who should know better). Despite their inability to pull ahead in the division, the Twins have received great performances from Justin Morneau and Francisco Liriano, and perhaps most surprisingly, competence from Delmon Young. However, it is hard not to notice the relatively down offensive season from Joe Mauer, whose .345 wOBA at the break is equal to that of fellow All-Star John Buck.

A .345 wOBA from a catcher is very valuable, of course, and Mauer has already accumulated 2.1 Wins Above Replacement, meaning he’d be close to 4 WAR over the full season (if you buy into “on pace for” stats, which you shouldn’t). One shouldn’t pin the blame for the Twins failure to run away with the division on Mauer’s “bad” hitting. Still, one certainly expected more from Mauer at the plate after his .438 wOBA (.365/.444/.587) in 2009. While the best pre-season projections expected some regression, they were still extremely impressed: CHONE projected a .401 wOBA and ZiPS a .415.

The primary difference between 2009 and 2010 so far has been Mauer’s power, as has been discussed in detail by David Golebiewski. I substantially agree with that analysis, and have little to add to it. Mauer’s opposite field approach is a rarity among hitter, but usually works for him. With a 10% career HR/FB rate, one expected it to come back down from 20.4% in 2009. Little else stands out in Mauer’s peripheral numbers that would make one think something is “wrong.” His walk rate is slightly down, which is likely related to his higher percentage of pitches chased out of the zone, but the whole league is chasing more pitches this season. He’s actually making contact more frequently so far this season, and is hitting more line drives, but while Mauer has a tremendous gift for hitting singles and doubles, his 2009 BABIP was unsustainable.

Expectations for Mauer’s 2010 go beyond projected peformance, however, and were tied, fairly or not, to the eight-year, $184 million dollar “hometown premium” extension for 2011-2018 he signed during the off-season. That was properly analyzed to death at the time, so I won’t go over it myself in detail. Depending on how much you think the dollars per marginal win will be starting in 2010 and the average rate of inflation, I’d say the Twins paid for a 5.5-6 WAR player starting in 2011, assuming average decline in production and 7% salary inflation over the life of the contract.

With that in mind, it is understandable if Mauer’s 2 WAR through a little over a half a season might not be quite “good enough” in the eyes of some. While there are reasons to be concerned about Mauer’s production in relation to the big contract (and it is a 50/50 shot at best that it will “pay off,” given that it was pretty much a market deal), it is worth remembering that observed performance is not the same as true talent, that a player’s performance as he ages is rarely perfectly linear, and, perhaps most of all, that the best projection systems that have taken into account of Mauer’s offensive performance this season still see his true talent as far above his current performance: ZiPS Rest of Season projections spits out a .394 wOBA (.323/.404/.491), and CHONE’s July 1 update as a +36/150 hitter (.319/.397/.483). The BABIP and power are unlikely to return to 2009 levels, but he’s probably better than this. Expect better production from Mauer over the second half, given good health

For those still understandably concerned about Mauer’s current performance in relation to the future, consider one alternate possibility: Mauer’s Big New Contract doesn’t start until next season. He’s making “only” $12.5 million dollars this season, and even if he only has a .345 wOBA over the rest of 2010, he’ll easily be worth more than that if he stays healthy. Maybe, just maybe, he’s waiting to turn on the ~.400 wOBA production until he’s actually getting paid for it.

Well played, Mauer, indeed.

I know that it’s a bit early to be speculating on possible 2011 free agent destinations, especially with certain monster sports stories taking up so much of the airwaves. But I’m sorry, I just have to talk about something other than Jermaine Dye and Jarrod Washburn still being free agents. However, after my posts on Jayson Werth (Monday) and David DeJesus (Wednesday), I have realized that something big is brewing in the coming off-season of baseball free agency. Something that will radically alter the way we think of how free agents conduct themselves from now on. You see, I think some players are going to make a joint Decision that will lead to a stacked outfield in one lucky city.

The Rays’ Carl Crawford is probably going to be the most sought-after free agent outfielder this winter. He has the most diverse set of skills, and won’t even be 30. But as he learned in 2008, he can’t win a championship all by himself. That’s where Werth, the second best free agent outfielder, comes in. He has that essential “championship experience” (a ring!) from 2008 with the Phillies that Crawford is “missing.” But they need a third player to complete their Death Tripod. It doesn’t have to be a player on their level, but someone who is definitely good, someone underrated, someone who will be a free agent this offseason. Someone like David DeJesus. Yes, I did write in my DeJesus post on Wednesday that if the Royals did (foolishly) decline his option and offer him arbitration that he would be likely to take it, but others seem to think he’s valuable enough that he would turn down arbitration to check his value on the market, with others making oblique Carlos Beltran (~!) references. Hey, what do I know? All I know is that it makes sense: these three are going to (if they haven’t already!) collectively decide to be on the same team next season. Sure, none of them is really a point g– I mean center fielder, but all of them have played it a bit at some point in their careers, and it would still be a plus defensive outfield overall.

But where would they sign? I think the obvious starting point is that is will be in a state known for its rich MLB tradition: Florida. But how to decide between two teams with such a rich legacies? Let me lay out the two most likely scenarios.

Scenario #1: All three meet in Miami. Isn’t it obvious? Sure, the Marlins have some okayish young outfield prospects, but they can trade those away for veteran pitching for the back of the rotation and middle relief. Some might doubt that the Marlins will open up their wallets after all these years (especially given all the draft picks they’d have to give up to sign these guys), but with a new stadium coming soon, a man of integrity like Jeffrey Loria isn’t just going to pocket the profits, right? It will be bitterly disappointing for Tampa Bay fans to watch homegrown superstar Carl Crawford play in the same, baseball-crazed state, but he will assuage their anger during his hour long special on the MLB network (hosted by Harold Reynolds) announcing his Decision to sign with the Marlins.

Scenario #2: Tampa Bay shocks the world by retaining Carl Crawford by essentially bribing him to stay by bringing in longtime friends Werth and DeJesus. Yes, Tampa Bay has a pretty small payroll, but these guys are willing to take less to win championships. Desmond Jennings obviously needs three or four more years to work on his “approach” in the minor leagues (they can always try to convert him to a catcher), and B. J. Upton needs to be non-tendered to teach him a lesson about “attitude.” The only snag is the potential rioting in Kansas City after DeJesus announces his Decision via a 15 minutes infomercial on public access cable.

Which scenario do you think is more likely? Is there another possible destination for the Outfield of Doom?

As has been written before, Royals outfielder David DeJesus is the sort of player who tends to fly under the radar because he does no one thing exceptionally well, but he does a number of things at an average or above-average level. He’s been about a 3 WAR player most of his career, and has accumulated almost that much value already in 2010. DeJesus probably isn’t an average center fielder any more, but runs saved in left or right field count, too. Despite having only average-ish power and being a terrible basestealer, DeJesus has a .344 career wOBA (.290/.361/.429). At 30, DeJesus is having a career year in 2010 offensively, with a .379 wOBA (.329/.397/.466). That probably is not his true talent level, but ZiPS’ rest-of-season projection is bullish nonetheless: .299/.369/.444 (.358 wOBA). One good test to see if a sports journalist has a clue is whether he or she says “David DeJesus is a fourth outfielder on a good team.” By my calculations, those people think that a fourth outfielder is someone whose true talent level over a full season is (conservatively, based on current projections) about 3 WAR. Draw your own conclusions.

Given DeJesus’ subtle combination of skills, it is ironic that the poorly-constructed-but-”official” Elias Rankings might somehow catch on to his value. According to the latest “reverse engineered” Elias Rankings at MLB Trade Rumors, if free agency started today, DeJesus would be Type A, meaning that if the Royals were to offer him arbitration and he turned it down then signed with another team, the Royals would get the signing team’s first round pick in the 2011 draft as well as supplemental pick.

This is particularly interesting because DeJesus is one of the Royals’ best trading chips due both to his value on the field and his team-friendly contract: $4.6 million for all of 2010 with a $6 milllion club option for 2011 (with a $500,000 buyout). Assuming DeJesus is only owed about two million dollars over the rest of the season and (using the conservative 3 WAR full season estimate) is projected to be worth about 1.5 wins at four million dollars per win, that’s four million dollars of surplus value this season. Assuming the team is smart and picks up the option, a half-win decline to 2.5 WAR for 2011 and inflation to about $4.5 million per win, that’s another five million dollars of surplus. Nine million dollars surplus could fetch something like good (if non-elite) prospect and perhaps some filler, and again, that’s based on a conservative estimate of DeJesus’ value.

But if DeJesus ends up a Type A free agent, that potentially adds an interesting wrinkle. In a Kansas City Star article from last month discussing DeJesus, several possible courses of action are mentioned, including trading DeJesus, picking up the 2011 option and keeping him, picking up the 2011 option and trading him in the offseason, and declining the option and then offering him arbitration in hopes he would turn it down and sign with another team, thus netting the Royals draft compensation. This last possibility is what interests me here.

It is an intriging suggestion, but ultimately, it is something the Royals should not do for two reasons. First of all, Victor Wang’s research on Type A compensation (summarized here) values average Type A compensation at about six million dollars. Assuming the Royals could make a fair trade (there is little point in analyzing possible screw-jobs) now at the conservatively-projected above surplus of nine million, the draft pick compensation wouldn’t hold up. Indeed, it is not clear that the draft pick compensation would even be more valuable than picking up DeJesus’ option and trading him in the offseason.

The second reason the arbitration-offer route is a bad idea is that DeJesus would be very likely to accept it. DeJesus is a good player that could help a lot of teams, but he isn’t a top-level talent like Matt Holliday was or Carl Crawford will be. He’s more like Orlando Hudson — a good player, but not good enough that teams are willing to overlook the draft pick they would have to give up to sign him. In each of the last two offseasons, Hudson ended up signing deals below his market value because teams were conscious of giving up the draft pick. DeJesus and his agent have no doubt noticed this, and realize they are likely to get a larger award in arbitration than free agency. If the Royals offer arbitration and DeJesus accepts, they not only don’t get the draft picks, but they would end up paying more in the arbitration award than they would have if they had picked up the option. Moreover, this would further reduce the surplus value (and thus potential return) DeJesus would have on the 2011 trade market.

DeJesus’ Type A status may bring send images of draft picks floating through the heads of Royals fans and officials. But given the likely outcome of that decision combined with the team’s current state, Kansas City should be looking to trade DeJesus now, as his value will never be higher.

Last week, a rumor circulated that the Philadelphia Phillies were exploring the trade market for right fielder Jayson Werth. I have no idea how much truth there is to this, and just to make things clear from the start, as long as the Phillies are in contention, I don’t think they should trade Werth. For a good take on the credibility of the rumor and the mess the Phillies have made for themselves in the outfield, see Rob Neyer’s blog post from last week. Hypothetically, though, how valuable would Werth be if the Phillies were to shop him?

Werth’s journey from Toronto to Los Angeles to Philadelphia makes for an interesting story, but I’m more interested in the present, in which Werth remains a somewhat under-appreciated star. Werth’s wOBA is over .380 for the fourth season in a row, and ZiPS rest-of-season projections projects a .384 wOBA (.276/.371/.500) over the rest of the season (CHONE’s July Update projects a very similar .273/.368/.491). In the 2010 run environment, that’s about a +30 hitter. Although Werth’s UZR numbers have gone down in 2009 and 2010, I still estimate him to be about a +10 right fielder over a full season. Taken together, +30 offense +10 fielding -7.5 position + 20 NL replacement level = about a 5 WAR player over a full season. Assuming he was traded now, with about half a season left, that’s 2.5 wins. Moreover, Werth is only being paid seven million dollars this season. Assuming four million dollars per marginal win, that’s about $6.5 million dollars in surplus value over the rest of the season. That could fetch a very good major league rental (depending on how much money does or doesn’t get thrown in by each team), or a solid (non-elite) prospect in a trade.

But wait, there’s more! Werth’s contract is up after the season, and he will almost certainly be a Type A free agent, meaning that if whichever team has him after the season offers him arbitration (which they should) and he turns it down (also likely) and signs with another team, the first team would get the signing team’s next first round draft pick plus supplemental pick. Victor Wang’s research on prospect and draft pick trade valuation (summarized by Sky Kalkman here) shows that the average value of Type A compensation is about $5.5 million. Whichever team has Werth at the end of the season (likely) gets that value as well, which nearly doubles Werth’s projected surplus value from the $6.5 million to $12 million. Prospects aside, this draft pick compensation boosts Werth’s value beyond his current performance and salary, and perhaps the Phillies could conduct a fair trade in which they add a player that helps their team even more than Werth over the remainder of the season, given that Werth’s value extends beyond his performance. This is an intriguing possibility… in principle.

Still, as I wrote at the beginning, barring an insanely favorable offer or an unforeseeable collapse that puts them out of contention, the Phillies should not go out of their way looking to trade Werth. For one thing, despite their current injury problems, Philadelphia is an old team built to win now, so unless they are willing to abandon that, they are not in a position to be looking to give up an outstanding player like Werth for prospects. More importantly, though hypothetically they might actually get a better “win now” player than Werth, in reality, it is hard to see it happening. The reason is obvious: only contending teams are looking to acquire a half-season rental like Werth, and although he has value beyond his projected performance/salary, in a fair trade, a contending team is not going to give up more current value for less current value plus a draft pick.

Jayson Werth is a very valuable player. For the Phillies, that value is best spent by keeping him around.