Baseball’s home-run surge this season is already well-documented, and analysts have turned over several theories for why this could be happening. Are steroids back? Has MLB juiced balls to give them more carry? Is this increase a result of an intentional shift toward power by baseball’s young sluggers? No matter what is happening, home runs are flying out of the park at record pace. At 4,459 home runs through 3,834 games, the 2016 HR/G rate is 1.16 – just barely trailing the all-time record of 1.17 HR/G set in steroid-heavy 2000.

Lately, baseball fans have been treated to a rookie performance for the ages, as New York Yankees catching phenom Gary Sanchez has hit .403/.459/.883 with 10 HR through only 20 games. Sanchez is only the third player in MLB history to swat 10 HRs through his first 20 games, joining George Scott of the 1966 Boston Red Sox and Trevor Story of the 2016 Colorado Rockies.

Sanchez has been a highly-regarded prospect for several years after signing with the Yankees as an international free agent in 2009, but he has never slugged at a rate like this before. Last season Sanchez swatted 18 HR in 365 minor league at-bats, and in 2014, he hit 13 HR in 429 minor league at-bats. In fact, Trevor Story is somewhat similar – he hit 14 HR in 396 minor-league at-bats in 2014 and 20 HR in 512 minor-league at-bats in 2015. Now in the big leagues, Story’s smashed 27 HR in 372 at-bats. Story’s home runs cannot all be credited to the homer-happy Coors Field which he calls home. Story has hit 11 HR in just 196 road at-bats, far outpacing his 2015 home-run rate.

While the success of Sanchez and Story can somewhat be credited to their power-friendly home-run parks and the natural tendency of talented ballplayers to grow into their power – they’re both only 23 years old – there may be more to this story than meets the eye. Below I compiled a list of all 2016 MLB rookies with more than 200 at-bats and compared their 2016 MLB home-run rates to their 2015 minor-league home-run rates. I had to exclude rookies who did not play in the U.S. minor-league system last year – Hyun Soo Kim, Dae-ho Lee, and Byung Ho Park. While this is far from a perfect science, the 200 at-bats should give us an interesting-enough sample size to examine.

Of the 16 rookies who qualify, 13 of them saw their AB/HR rate drop significantly, a counter-intuitive result as MLB pitching is far superior to that of Double-A or Triple-A pitching. Two of the three remaining rookies saw their AB/HR rates remain basically unchanged (Cheslor Cuthbert and Tyler White). And finally, Ramon Flores was the sole rookie who saw his AB/HR rate rise notably, though we could possibly point to the severe ankle injury he suffered at the end of last season as a partial culprit for his slip in play. Flores has seen dips in his batting average, on-base percentage, and other offensive rates as well this year.

The rookie home-run bounce is almost universal and includes: Jefry Marte (23.8 AB/HR in AAA in 2015 to 19.6 AB/HR in MLB in 2016), Alex Dickerson (21.7 AB/HR in AAA this season to 19.9 AB/HR after getting called up), and of course Sanchez (20.3 AB/HR in AAA in 2015 to 7.7 AB/HR in 2016).

Just two years ago, analysts were arguing that the jump from AAA to MLB may be getting harder for young players, but now we’re seeing exactly the opposite, at least for position players.

Let’s see how minor-league players transitioned to the major leagues in the past. With the HR spike occurring late in 2015, we’ll use data from 2014 rookies and their 2013 minor-league seasons. I compiled a list of 18 MLB rookies with at least 300 at-bats in 2014. I excluded Jose Abreu who did not have 2013 minor-league numbers.

This looks much more natural. The majority of rookies (11) saw their AB/HR rates rise, often dramatically, while others saw their AB/HR rates basically stay the same and a few others saw an decrease. Again, this aligns with the common knowledge that MLB pitching is tougher than minor league pitching.

So why are the 2014 and 2016 rookie tables so different? The data would indicate that something happened between these years to make graduating to the MLB so much easier for rookie position players.

Finally, we can look at rookie pitchers and compare their home runs allowed per 9 innings pitched from last year in the minor leagues to this year in the majors. I’ve compiled a list of the 13 MLB rookies to cross the 75-innings-pitched plateau this year. I had to exclude rookies Tyler Anderson (didn’t pitch in 2015) and Kenta Maeda (didn’t pitch in the U.S. in 2015).

Of the 13 rookies, nine saw their HR/9 rates rise notably, two saw their rates basically stay the same, and two saw their rates lower and improve in the majors. (It should be noted that Archie Bradley Jr. threw only 29.3 IP in 2015, and Devenski has shifted from a starter to primarily a reliever this year. This may have skewed their numbers.)

This chart should not come as a surprise, as rookie pitchers have historically allowed more hits, walks, and home runs to superior competition, at least in their first few months of big league time.

Yet the near-universal increase of home runs, whether hit or allowed, by players making a transition from the minor leagues to the major leagues indicates that something is happening at the major-league level specifically. We can likely dismiss sudden steroid use, as the majority of users historically have come from the minor leagues. (Unless major-league players have sole access to a super-drug that goes undetected in urine tests, but now we’re wading into something else completely.) We may also be able to disregard theories such as “young players are altering their swings to hit for more power and strikeouts,” because wouldn’t these “altered swings” result in more home runs in the minor leagues against inferior pitching? Once again an altered or juiced baseball at the major-league level appears to be the most obvious culprit, although no hard evidence has been discovered.

An increase in power transitioning from the minor leagues to the major leagues is counter-intuitive to everything we know about the game’s structure.

Over the last 10 years, MLB payrolls, and player salaries, have grown significantly as league revenue continues to rise. According to Forbes, MLB pulled in $9 billion in revenue last season. Teams are pulling in billions of dollars through massive television contracts — the Yankees pulled in $1.5 billion in a 2012 deal, the Angels secured a $3 billion deal in 2011, and the Dodgers reached a deal for over $8 billion (although the TV situation in LA is still a mess for fans). Fifteen MLB teams (exactly half) are valued at $1 billion or more, with the Yankees ($3.2 billion) and Dodgers ($2.4 billion) on top.

The chart below shows each team’s 2006 payroll and 2015 payroll and the rate of growth over those 10 years. While all teams fluctuated on a year-by-year basis (looking at you, Atlanta and Miami), 27 teams saw payroll increase, and 25 teams saw an increase of over 10 percent.

The average 2006 MLB team had a payroll of $77.6 million, while the average 2015 MLB team had a payroll of $121.9 million (an increase of $44.4 million, or 57.2%). The Toronto Blue Jays, more or less, represent the average MLB team payroll growth over the 2006-2015 period. The Marlins, who had slashed their payroll to a ridiculous $15 million after a trademark Marlins fire sale in the 2005-2006 offseason, saw the biggest payroll increase by percentage, followed by Washington and Kansas City who have clawed their way out of baseball’s cellar over the last 10 seasons. The Astros, coming off a World Series appearance in 2005, had the franchise’s biggest payroll ever in 2006. Several years of losing and rebuilding saw that number drop by 25.4 percent, although the Astros are reportedly looking to spend this offseason. The Braves are undergoing a massive rebuild and shedding all salary, while the Mets have been slowly climbing out of their financial troubles.

Perhaps the most surprising rank on this chart is that of the Yankees, who have increased payroll a mere 9.7 percent over the last 10 years. In fact, the team had a higher payroll in 2005 ($208.3 million), then they did last season ($203.8 million). In 2006, the Yankees were the only team spending more than $130 million on payroll and had a $70+ million financial advantage over MLB’s second-biggest spenders (the Red Sox). Now, the Dodgers have passed New York in spending, and nine teams have crossed the $130-million mark (and more will follow this offseason). Yankee ownership has pointed to the goal of getting under the $189 million luxury tax threshold.

Nine of the 10 World Series champions over this period increased payroll after winning it all (2007 Boston being the exception).

The Giants’ 2012-2013 offseason acquisitions of Angel Pagan, Marco Scutaro, and Jeremy Affeldt, along with arbitration increases for Buster Posey, Sergio Romo, Hunter Pence, and others added up to around $60 million worth of additional payroll for 2013. Of course, winning the World Series is a huge financial boon to an MLB team with increased ticket sales, increased merchandise sales, bigger TV contracts, etc…

The next chart contrasts overall (2006-2015) regular season winning percentage with the increase in payroll over the same time period.

(Note: I removed the Miami Marlins from this chart since a) they are an extreme outlier because of the 2005-2006 fire sale, and b) I’m not sure team ownership is concerned with winning percentage.)

Many people assume that spending automatically leads to winning, but this is not always the case. The Nationals (two 100-loss seasons coupled with a massive increase in spending) pretty much single-handedly pull this trendline down. The Angels, Giants, and Dodgers have seen increased payrolls result in regular season (and for the Giants, postseason) wins, while the Mariners, Rockies, and Royals (2014-2015 notwithstanding) have not. The Yankees again stand out as the winningest team, while keeping payroll relative stable.

(Note: For the same reason as above, the Marlins have been removed from this chart.)

As we would expect, investment in payroll leads to fan interest and increased attendance numbers. Also, the teams with more recent success (Toronto, Pittsburgh, Washington) received a huge boost in attendance numbers over the last few seasons. They have all significantly increased payroll since 2006.

Only one team in MLB raised its payroll less than average and still enjoyed a winning percentage above .500 AND an increase in attendance. Unsurprisingly, this team was the St. Louis Cardinals who raised payroll a mere 35.3 percent, played .549 baseball from 2006-2015, enjoyed a small uptick (around 2 percent) in attendance in 2015 compared with 2006, and won two World Series titles (2006, 2011) for good measure.

If you’ve ever attended a Nationals’ home game, you’ve probably seen the best promotional event held in the Washington D.C. area– the Presidents Race. Beginning as a cartoon race featured on the video board of old RFK Stadium in 2005, the first-ever live race was held on July 21, 2006. The 10-foot tall presidents run the length of the field — across the warning track, down the foul lines, around the diamond — while often avoiding obstacles such as traffic cones and competing teams’ mascots. The race reached a fever pitch in the community and media in 2012 when Teddy Roosevelt finally broke his humiliating 500+ race-losing streak. The original competitors — Teddy, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson — were joined by William Howard Taft in 2013 and Calvin Coolidge earlier this month.

As we approach the 9th year anniversary of the Presidents Race, I thought it would be interesting to look for correlation between the Presidents Race winners and the Washington Nationals’ on-field performance. Let’s begin with a few caveats. I’ll be looking at data from the beginning of 2013 to July 2, 2015. I chose 2013 as a starting point because it marked the end of Teddy’s losing streak and the beginning of William’s running career. I did not include any data from Calvin’s career because of small-sample-size issues. Also, regarding the racing record in relation to the Nats’ performance, I include data from 4th-inning races, extra-inning races, both races in a double-header, and all playoff races. Finally, I want to give a big thanks to Let Teddy Win! which is a tremendous wealth of Presidents Race knowledge, data, and video.

Abraham is the easy race champion over this time period, finishing 2nd in the final standings in 2013 and 2014. Teddy was carried by his impressive 29-win campaign in 2014, while let’s just say that Thomas is better at writing declarations than at running races. It should be noted that Teddy has been disqualified many times in his racing career because of infractions like unnecessary roughness and cutting the outfield corner.

From 2013-2015, the Nationals were 123-80 (.606) at home, the 3rd best home record in MLB, trailing only St. Louis (.667) and Pittsburgh (.632) over the same time period. To fully appreciate the influence (for better or worse) that the Presidents Race winners had over the Nationals’ on-field performance, we need to look for the winning percentages farthest from .606.

Unsurprisingly, the father of our nation has the biggest positive influence over the Nationals ballclub, leading the squad to a crushing .697 winning percentage. The newcomer, William, also inspired the Nats to play well, despite their mediocre run differential after his race victories. And while Nats fans and opponents may love Teddy (first as a lovable loser and now as a legit competitor), Nats players have not been inspired on the nights he crosses the finish line first. (Teddy went undefeated in the 2014 playoffs, and the Nats went winless in those games.)

The front-runner for this year’s National League Most Valuable Player is clearly inspired by the nation’s front-runner for Most Valuable President. At the plate after a George victory, Harper mashes to the tune of .325, while on-pace for a 50+ HR season. Teddy and Abraham again bring up the rear, and William has another strong showing, reinforcing the idea that “as Harper goes, so go the Nationals.”

Not only does Zimmermann pitch more often on George-victory days than on other days, but he also puts up his best numbers after George pulls out a win. Teddy upsets the pattern by inspiring Zimmerman to a 2.35 ERA and a 9 K/9 mark, the best of the five.

Taft famously threw the first-ever presidential first-pitch, yet both Nats pitchers remain uninspired on William’s victory days. Thomas remains the least influential president (perhaps due to the rarity of his victories), inspiring the team, Harper, and both pitchers to average winning percentages and average career numbers. Lincoln inspires Storen’s lowest ERA and 2nd best K/9.

The results of this data crunch are clear: while Teddy may be a lovable loser, some of that losing might be rubbing off on the Nationals. And if you’re a Nats fan, you probably want to root for George. Bryce Harper and Jordan Zimmermann clearly do.

We see it every night. A weak groundball to a defensively incapable player, a broken-bat roller behind the mound into no-man’s-land, a slap hit into the vacated area caused by the shift, a tomahawk chop resulting in a dirt-bounce that goes 20 feet upward. Not good enough to be a true hit, not bad enough to be an error. Infield hits are awkward.

“It’ll look like a line drive in the box score,” the broadcasters chirp happily. And while that’s very true, I would argue that infield hits are ESPECIALLY demoralizing for pitchers. Usually, the pitcher made a quality pitch, got the groundball he was looking for, and had little control over the infield defensive positioning or assignments. But because the official scorer ruled the play too difficult for a fielder to make, any runs driven in by the infield hit or resulting later in the inning will be earned.

Infield hits are the result of bad defensive skill, poor defensive positioning, poor use of the shift, sloppy weather conditions, speedy runners, jittery infielders, and/or good old fashioned bad luck. So which pitchers have been victimized the most by infield hits? Let’s look at the numbers for each league.

American League pitchers have allowed 9,650 hits, including 1,166 infield hits (as of June 29). The infield hits/hits rate in the American League, therefore, is 12.1%.

The Athletics’ defense ranks worst in the American League with a -23.9 UZR, and the team’s two best starters suffer a plethora of infield hits allowed. Take out Gray’s 17 infield hits allowed, and his already pristine 0.99 WHIP falls to 0.84 WHIP. Without the infield hits, Chris Sale of Chicago would also see his WHIP drop to a crazy 0.82 WHIP. (The ChiSox need to figure out how to shift.) Keuchel is the king of groundballs (64.5% GB), so infield hits are only natural to him. Same goes for Madson and his 56.4% GB rate. The Yankees’ middle infield has been miserable this year, and the team doesn’t know how to shift properly. Warren, Rogers, and Betances have been the poor-luck “beneficiaries.”

Nate Karns (45.4% GB) and Brad Boxberger (36.6% GB) are the real enigmas here, as the Rays have the second-best defense in the AL. Bad luck? Infielders hate them? Poor use of the shift by Tampa Bay coaches? According to Inside Edge, Rays defenders make only 4% of very difficult plays, labelled “remote.” Since these plays are too difficult to be ruled an error if the defender miffs, these balls in-play are often ruled infield hits (if, of course, they occur on the infield). For the curious, the Yankees are dead last (1.2%), and the Blue Jays are first (19%).

Zach Britton’s rate really jumps out, but it is most likely a result of very few hits allowed overall and, as with all the relievers, a small sample size. Britton has only allowed 28 hits on the season, and only 17 have left the infield. Dominant.

National League pitchers have allowed 9,892 hits, including 1,174 infield hits (as of June 29). The infield hits/hits rate in the National League, therefore, is 11.8%.

Noah Syndergaard (16.6% infield hits/hits) just missed this list, so that’s three Mets starters who have allowed way more infield hits than the average NL starter. The Mets have already taken Wilmer Flores off shortstop, but Eric Campbell (-1.1 UZR) and Daniel Murphy (-2 UZR) aren’t helping either. Brett Anderson (68.7% GB rate) is the most predictable pitcher on this chart, but Alex Wood and Shelby Miller are not, especially since 2B Jace Peterson and SS Andrelton Simmons flash the leather on a nightly basis. (Do the Braves  suffer from the Dee Gordon effect or just from poor use of the shift?)

The Cardinals infield has been below average defensively (Matt Carpenter -1.6 UZR; Mark Reynolds -1.6 UZR; Jhonny Peralta -1.1 UZR), which partially explains Lynn and Rosenthal. Starlin Castro (-3.4 UZR) and Arismendy Alcantara (-2.0 UZR) have not helped out Hendricks or Strop defensively either. Benoit is on the wrong team defensively to have a career-high ground ball rate (43.6%).

Finally, who has been stingy with infield hits? For the American League:

And for the National League:

Just something else Max Scherzer has been amazing at in 2015.