The Risk of Long Contracts for Middle-Market Teams

Middle-market teams have historically tried to play the game like they are mini-large-market teams. They develop talent and when they have enough to make a run at the playoffs they make moves. They buy free agents, extend players through their age 27-33 years, and trade for proven talent. Unfortunately this usually does not work and we often see one of the top six most expensive teams (or the Cardinals) in the playoffs year after year. Then, the middle-market team’s “window” has closed, and the wait starts over.

It is time to have a change in the tradition of middle-market teams, and this includes the Texas Rangers.
The focus should not be on operating on a “window” of time where a World Series run is possible, but to create a team where there are very few years where this window is not open. The Cardinals are a good example of executing this plan. They rotate talent in and out due to a solid player-development system, while making very few large free-agent signings. This leads to a team where there is never too much money tied up to one or two players, and they can afford to make short-term deals or trades for players who add value to the team immediately without tying up long-term cash.

Let’s talk about how this relates to the Rangers though, specifically Elvis Andrus and his extension as this issue extends to all of the contracts the Rangers have given out. Most people look back and ask the wrong question as it was never about whether the Rangers thought Elvis was really going to be good for his contract. The Rangers obviously thought that he would be. The question the Rangers should have asked themselves is, should a middle-market team take a large risk by signing a player whose peak will probably be around age 26 to an eight-year extension, well past his peak? For a middle-market team, the contract is near impossible to avoid down the stretch if for some reason the player does not achieve the level of success that is expected.

Other situations, like Adrian Beltre, have worked. However, can you imagine a world where the Rangers spent all that money on Beltre, only to have him be awful? Of course you can, and it would have been miserable. The Rangers were fortunate that Beltre had a second peak at 31 that has lasted five years. Beltre is the exception, not the rule, and the Rangers should not expect to get lucky on a contract like his very often. It was a very high-risk offer that ended up working out. Unfortunately, we have the opposite side of the spectrum as well. Shin-Soo Choo was given a similar contract to Beltre, at a similar age. Unfortunately, this contract appears to be flat and the Rangers are already looking for a way to move Choo on.

The Rangers made a series of high-risk contract moves when they had players in the minors who were only a year or two away from being able to contribute on a major-league team, which led to a large amount of money being tied up. This is not to say that all long-term contracts are bad. If the Rangers were able to find a franchise player who brings extreme value consistently with a skill set that ages well, the risk would be worth the shot as long as a reasonable deal could be achieved.

The ultimate conclusion is that as a middle-market team, the Rangers should have a change in focus from spending money on long-term contracts, which are huge risks, to using money and trades to put together a solid supporting cast of players on shorter-length contracts. These players will support a group of younger cost-controlled players where their risk of failure is not tied to large amounts of cash. It is a superior strategy to hoping that during a window of opportunity, where long-term contract players are not past their prime, the team will make the playoffs a few times. If played correctly, with the Rangers’ amazing farm system and development team, the Rangers could have a consistently good team for long periods of time.