Early Rounds, every on is fighting for premiere players, getting the backbone of there team

Middle Rounds, looking at deals, more specialized hitters (SB only, or HR only) players

Late Rounds, trying to fill some gaps, maybe pick up some cheap prospects

This varies depending on money left over. I know one guy who will have a good amount of money late, he does pretty well, not my style, but he can be a bully in the late rounds. Money is leverage, but when there isn’t value there it doesn’t matter really. I know one guy who will throw out 1 dollar players early, trying to get them then, because in the late round, 1 dollar players sometimes goes for 2-5, maybe 10+ dollars because people are scrapping for categories they missed, and they have money to spend.

So dynamics change, but i think looking at categories specifically can lead to advantages later on in the rounds if you know, ok, there was 500 dollars in HR’s to being with, now there’s only 100 dollars left, but there’s 300 dollars left in SB. If you can keep track of that per person, you can get a feel on how they are drafting, and know, if you can pick up a steal later on in the draft

]]>When I used your system last yr I found the same problems and made what sounds like similar fixes, but I’d like to see exactly what you did.

Thanks!

]]>By this method (which I generally agree with), a player’s value is determined by the combination of his own statistical accumulations and the replacement level at that position. The value of players at certain positions, however, are more heavily influenced by the replacement level half of this equation than by the individual contribution half (for example, Victor Martinez gains more from his position as a percentage of his total value than does Mark Teixeira). The question is, does it matter which side of the equation value contribution comes from?

The higher the percentage of value coming from the positional contribution (as with catchers, for example), the more a player’s value is dependent on our ability to project not only the player’s stats but also those of the replacement-level player at that position. To the degree a player’s value relies on our ability to predict two sets of performances rather than one, the potential variance in actual performance relative to projected performance rises (as we must add two sets of variances rather than just one), and the reliability of our value estimate falls. A less stat-speak way of thinking about this might be as follows: given the choice between a second-tier first baseman and an elite catcher with the same calculated value, the catcher’s value is more volatile (and drafting him is therefore more likely to backfire) because his value is more significantly effected than the first baseman’s should each player hit 5 homeruns fewer than projected and the replacement-level at each position hit 5 more.

It would seem from the above that there either be some measure of volatility to accompany the value estimate, or, if we would still want to bake everything into one number, that the value contributed by positional weakness be discounted at some rate to account for the inherent volatility.

]]>I agree that the Z-score method is appropriate and the mathematical conversion of scores to dollars is straightforward, so I’m not sure where the disconnect is. Perhaps the definition of replacement? Or is it that people are systematically and grossly overvaluing top-end production?

Also, in case you were wondering, I assumed that the average team used 5 roster spots and $25 on minor leaguers, which seemed appropriate for my league, so I accounted for this in the auction conversion equation.

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