Author Archive

How Sprint Speed Relates to Stolen Bases

Yesterday, I wrote about how sprint speed relates to wOBA minus expected wOBA (wOBA–xwOBA). Today, I summarize my investigation into what factors most readily affect a player’s stolen base success rate (SB%).

This invitation from BatFlip Crazy, embedded in this lengthy Twitter exchange, served as the catalyst for the research. In hindsight, I’m not sure I totally answered the question. Manipulating data from multiple different sources (in this case, Baseball Reference and Baseball Savant) can be exhausting.

I used my final Frankenstein data set, which contained statistics for all players from 2016-18 with at least 100 stolen base opportunities (SBOs) in a given season, to investigate relationships among the following various stolen base metrics:

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How Sprint Speed Relates to wOBA–xwOBA

Fantasy analysts and enthusiasts alike are still searching for ways to use Statcast’s expected wOBA (xwOBA) metric meaningfully to gain an edge. Unfortunately, beyond leveraging the difference between xwOBA and actual wOBA (what I, and probably countless others, refer to as the “wOBA minus xwOBA differential”), I don’t know yet how else you can use xwOBA effectively. Given already-widespread use of the metric, the minimal edge you can glean will come from interpretation.

I discussed the interpretation of xwOBA multiple times in 2018. In May, I highlighted hitters on whom to buy low because of their extreme/outlier wOBA–xwOBA differentials. In July, I called out xwOBA’s inability to account for what appeared to be the ball becoming un-juiced, thereby overestimating xwOBA across the league. In September, I investigated the predictiveness of xwOBA in-season (that is, the predictiveness of first-half xwOBA on second-half wOBA).

I discussed all of these topics during my presentation at BaseballHQ’s annual First Pitch Arizona forum, especially the former-most. Basically all of the hitters I tabbed as buy-lows outgained their prior performance by substantial margins — all of them, that is, except for Victor Martinez. Could he be considered a miss? Sure, except he was different from the rest of his fellow underachievers: he perennially underperforms his xwOBA. Perhaps the better question, then, is: Why was he a miss?

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2019 xADP, New and Improved

About a month ago, I published a post that predicted 2019 ADP (“xADP”) values using eight years’ worth of average draft position (ADP) data from the National Fantasy Baseball Championship (NFBC) and end-of-season (EOS) values from Razzball. The model was pretty good — it explained nearly 60 percent of the data’s variance (adjusted r2 = 0.59), which is pretty dang good. It felt unfulfilled, though; it accounted for some players but not others — namely, breakout rookies who were completely off the radar the previous season and top prospects who had yet to debut.

I took some time (really, a lot of time) to clean up my data to see how much it would improve my model, if at all:

  1. Originally, my data set did not account for players who were not drafted (aka had no ADP value) but made an impact in 2018 (think Juan Soto). Conversely, my data did account for players who were drafted but made no impact in 2018 (think, uh, Troy Tulowitzki, I guess). It was kind of like addressing a Type I error but ignoring a Type II error (or the other way around? I don’t know). I took painstaking care to fill in these holes.
  2. I took equally painstaking care to ensure all player names were consistent — no “Nick Castellanos”/”Nicholas Castellanos” mismatches that might pollute the analysis. Odds are, there are a couple of players I missed, but having spent hours poring over the data, I feel confident that the issue is no longer pervasive.
  3. I added ages! They make a small impact, most meaningful to players at the extremes, such as the very young (think Ronald Acuna) and the very old (think Nelson Cruz).
  4. Lastly, a theoretical and methodological adjustment: I forced negative ADP values to $0. I wanted the model to reflect an actual draft, in which players are never bought at auction for negative dollars — rather, their values converge on zero. It’s important to note here that a player can still end the season with negative value based on the concept of replacement level. Accordingly, only negative ADP values, and not negative EOS values, were forced zero.

Fortunately, the extra work was worth it: the model boasts an adjusted r2 of 0.75 (with ages; 0.73 without). That’s a massive improvement, and it can be attributed almost entirely to the slight (but profound) change in the model specification.

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Which Source for Pitching Metrics is Best?

Rob Silver, the 2016 National Fantasy Baseball Championship (NFBC) Main Event winner and high-stakes fantasy baseball extraordinaire, messaged me on Twitter a few days ago to ask a question: Which source of pitching statistics are most accurate? I’m paraphrasing. Also, I could paraphrase the question any number of ways: Which source should we be using? Which most reliably correlates with pitcher performance?

It was a question for which I had no answer. Admittedly, I use a variety of sources, none of which align with one another — something I have noticed before but about which I can do nothing but shrug and accept it as a quirk of being a sabermetrician who bears the struggle of dealing with publicly available data.

The sources cryptically mentioned above include the following:

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Alex Chamberlain’s 2018 Bold Predictions – A Review

When introducing my 2018 bold predictions, I talked about “not being bold just to be bold.” I sought to demonstrate that, by “abiding by The Process TM,” I could make bold predictions that, frankly, didn’t feel all htat bold to me. In hindsight, it’s easy to say how they really weren’t bold. But back when I made them, based on available average draft position (ADP) data, they were, by definition, bold.

It would sound arrogant for me to say my bold predictions this year could be used as a clinic on extracting value in drafts (especially with the social baggage that “putting on a clinic” carries these days). However, it might not be untrue: I hit three of my five predictions, all of them relating to guys who played key roles in the drafts of successful teams this year. Please, do forgive the arrogance, then; I’ll do my best to explain how the strategies I employed this year are repeatable.

All end-of-season values will rely on ESPN’s Player Rater.

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Predicted 2019 NFBC ADP

Disclaimer: This is just for fun. I am, by no means, claiming that the predicted average draft positions (ADPs) described below will happen. Obviously! I’m no prophet. Also, I am not claiming these predictions are merely educated guesses. In fact, these aren’t even my predictions — they’re yours. Or, well, they’re not your predictions — they’re my computer’s predictions, but fitting your behavior to observed events.

That’s a complicated way of saying: by using historical ADP data and end-of-season (EOS) values, we can model future ADP values. (xADP, if you will.) Namely, with 2018 EOS, 2018 ADP, and 2017 EOS, we can predict 2019 ADP — and explain almost 60 percent of its variance (adjusted r2 = 0.59).

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The In-Season Predictiveness of xwOBA

I use xwOBA as a leading indicator of good or bad things to come mid-season, for better or for worse. It’d be good to know if such reliance is truly warranted. I further talked myself into the idea when I wrote about several underperforming hitters in early June. Many of the names therein went on some serious heaters afterward, too. It wasn’t as prescient as it was playing the odds: the hitters underperforming xwOBA most extremely through two months always, always (in the Statcast EraTM) bounce back to some degree.

It’s “predictive,” but not universally so, and only by virtue of common sense, in the same way a pitcher who allows a sub-.200 batting average on balls in play (BABIP) through two months could not reasonably sustain this high level of contact management. (There’s a discussion to be had here about the gambler’s fallacy, but I don’t think it necessarily applies to baseball. For another day.)

In terms of prior work, it’s all Baseball ProspectusJonathan Judge (only a slight exaggeration): he compared xwOBA to BP’s DRA metric as well as FIP (fielding independent pitching), a much simpler ERA estimator, and showed xwOBA is hardly superior to the field, at least for pitching. However, the article only covered year-to-year, not in-season, correlations.

After our dear and departed (but not dead) Eno Sarris asked Judge if he had looked at in-season correlations specifically, and after our dear and departed (and also not dead) Mike Petriello reinforced the notion that xwOBA could serve as an in-season predictor of regression under certain circumstances, I figured it’s high time I just tackle the question.

So: How predictive is xwOBA of wOBA in-season? For hitters and for pitchers?

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Adalberto Mondesi, and the Byron Buxton Question(s)

I think there are not one, but many, questions because there are not one, but many, ways Adalberto Mondesi and Byron Buxton are similar.

Here’s one answer to one possible question:

I can’t say I’m surprised, but I’m kind of surprised. I asked this question very deliberately, its design not remotely accidental, the response options dripping with subtext. Mondesi, with his elite speed, decent power for a speedster, and very questionable contact skills, in 2018 is almost a dead ringer for Buxton in 2017. Mondesi doesn’t quite have Buxton’s baggage — he doesn’t carry the weight of expectations of a No. 1 prospect — but he has his own, continuing a familial legacy. But they do have a lot in common, as aforementioned, which can be summarily boiled down to this great quip from our Eric Longenhagen: “wholly untamed physical abilities.”

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Quick Takes: Zobrist, Flaherty, Marquez, Pivetta, Castillo, Gray, Godley

(Not to be confused with Jeff Zimmerman’s delightful Quick Looks.)

In terms of fantasy topics to discuss, I’ve been pretty unmotivated for the last month. I took to Twitter to solicit some ideas. Rather than letting myself procrastinate and become unmotivated about these interesting topics, I figured I’d knock a few out at once with some quick takes.

The re-emergence of Ben Zobrist

Or, conversely, the caving-in of the rest of the Cubs’ offense.

Sure, there have been bright spots: Javier Baez makes for a nice down-ballot MVP candidate, Kyle Schwarber is not a liability, and Jason Heyward is a non-zero with the bat for the first time since moving to Chicago. But for everyone else? Not so much.

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Madison Bumgarner’s Fastball is (Still) Broken

If something about Madison Bumgarner’s first eight starts of 2018 have seemed odd to you, it’s because they have been. No matter the fielding independent pitching statistic to which you subscribe — FIP, xFIP, SIERA (although, frankly, it should be SIERA) — Bumgarner’s 2018 has not inspired confidence. Despite a dazzling (and quintessentially Bumgarnerian) 2.90 ERA, his baserunner suppression skills (i.e. strikeouts and walks) have lagged this year, and the various FIPs all portend severe bumps in the road. Granted, Bumgarner has outperformed his FIPs the last three years and throughout his career. I’m here to argue not that we should dismiss our concerns because of this but, instead, that such overperformance has insulated us from what should be potentially serious concerns about MadBum’s long-term health and success.

The problems with Bumgarner’s 2018 season — or at least the peripherals that underpin his 2018 season — thus far stem back not to his broken finger but, rather, something both farther back and much more dire. You may or may not recall Bumgarner fell off a dirt bike last year and injured his throwing shoulder. He returned from that injury almost exactly a year ago and promptly underwhelmed us. Sure, he posted a 3.43 ERA through September and has a 3.23 ERA in the calendar year since his return. It’s not vintage Bumgarner, but it’s not awful. But the peripherals, oh, the peripherals: his strikeout rate (K%) has caved dramatically, falling more than 6 percentage points (27.1% from April 2015 through April 2017; 20.9% from July 2017 onward).

It’s his fastball. Bumgarner’s fastball, once elite (relative to other four-seamers), is broken, and it has been broken for a year.

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